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This thesis deals with the reasons the Caribbean is of
interest economically and militarily to the United States.
It examines factors affecting foreign policy formulation;
essential materials, supplies, and trade routes; Soviet and
Cuban activities in the region; and political, economic, and
military recommendations based on these aspects to ensure the
continued existence of the Caribbean as a free area, secure
from Soviet and Cuban involvement and interference. In so
doing it examines why the region is important to United States
security and economic prosperity.
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I. THE CARIBBEAN: U.S. ECONOMIC AND MILITARY INTERESTS
For the last two decades the affairs of the Caribbean have
been largely ignored by the people and the government of the
United States. With the perception of this vital area as our
"backyard", the possibility of difficulties arising that could
not be quickly remedied was not credible to the American peo-
ple. Castro's Cuba, a major instigator of instability in the
Caribbean area, was largely ignored, if not sympathetically
viewed, as a pathetic little regime of no real consequence
to the United States.
Something of an awakening began with the stationing of
Cuban troups in Angola and the Horn of Africa. Also of em-
phasis was the overthrow of Somoza by the Sandinistas. Despite
proffered United States friendship and aid, the true colors
of the revolution showed themselves in increasing antipathy
to the United States and in the export of the revolution to
neighboring El Salvador.
Throughout all of this the United States public, by and
large ignorant of the strategic importance of the area, and
considerable segments of the United States government, question
United States involvement in the region. To many it seems
to be merely a retrogression to the days of gunboat diplomacy
and saber-rattling, with all of the assorted negative conno-
tations which that implies. Many are blinded to the realities

of the situation by the hue and cry raised over social issues
in the region, ignoring the increasing levels of outside spon-
sored insurgencies. The necessity of maintaining this area
as a source of vital raw materials, as the crossroads of much
of the United States oceanborne commerce, and in its geostra-
tegic military importance raises charges of imperialism and
neo-colonialism. The idea that the United States is attempting
to "support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjuga-
tion by armed minorities or outside pressures" and that we
are involved in an attempt to "assist free peoples to work
2
out their own destinies in their own way" is dismissed as
a cover for more insidious motives. Defending the United
States 1 national interest has taken on negative connotations.
What is not recognized by the majority of these people
is that the Caribbean is of major strategic concern to the
United States. The region is economically, militarily, and
hence, diplomatically important to the United States. The
failure to defend United States interests in the region,
whether perceived or actual, is a failure to adequately rep-
resent the people of the United States by the government which
was elected to that purpose.
Richard S. Kirkendall, "Truman Doctrine", Encyclopedia




II. UNITED STATES INTERESTS
Prior to describing United States Interests in the Carib-
bean, it becomes necessary to conceptualize the national in-
terest of the United States on a worldwide or macro viewpoint
prior to analyzing any particular region. It is necessary
to define those interests so as to not make them a matter of
supposition. Elucidation eliminates, or at least reduces,
possible confusion over basic core points. As policy does
not occur in a vacuum, it is also necessary to describe the
forces impinging on the development of strategies to best
achieve the goals established by the national interest. The
more prominent of these forces are realism, idealism, self-
interest and the opinions of the Presidency, Congress and the
public. These forces are important since it is through their
interaction that the strategies (that is, domestic and foreign
policy,) to achieve desired goals are determined.
A. DEFINING THE NATIONAL INTEREST
One would assume that an in-depth analysis of the concept
of the national interest would be a process of self-evident
iterations. This proves to be far from the actual case. It
becomes similar to an attempt at trying to describe the taste
of salt. Everyone is quite convinced that he knows exactly
what salt tastes like, but when it comes to describing that
taste to someone, we are in a quandary as to verbalizing that

very basic tasts. It quickly proves futile to attempt a de-
scription. In a sense, this is much the same problem found
when describing the national interest. Most people seem to
feel that the national interest of the United States is very
self-evident, but when they are pressed to conceptualize those
interests, then it becomes a complex and evasive issue to them.
It becomes very difficult to iterate the basis of United States
policy: the national interest.
1 . The Strategic Doctrine
As an aspect of defining the national interest, it
is important to understand the strategic doctrine of the United
States, since it is based on and is further illustrated by
the national interest.
The strategic doctrine of the United States herein
described was in existence prior to, but is most readily recog-
nized in the contents of, The Declaration of Independence (1776)
and the Constitution (1787). The basic concepts established
in these documents have not changed, however, the means avail-
able to strive for their achievement have changed over time.
The Preamble to the Constitution states that the government
of the United States, that is, "We the people", are to "form
a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tran-
quility, provide for the common defense and secure the blessings
of liberty to ourselves and our posterity" . These concepts
are repeated throughout American history. Similarly, it was
set down in the Declaration of Independence that:
10

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men
are created equal, that they are endowed by their Crea-
tor with certain inalienable rights, that among these
rights are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness,
and that whenever any form of government becomes de-
structive of these ends, it is the right of the people
to alter or abolish it and to institute new government.
These "truths" were established in the history of the
peoples that had come to America to find the freedom that
could not be obtained in the countries from which they had
come. This quest for freedom was to be a major force in estab-
lishing our national interests as they are described in two
of the most famous (and idealistic) documents in the history
of the United States of America.
In actuality, the national interest existed prior to
these documents, but it was somewhat codified in them, and,
in effect, created our strategic doctrine. In other words,
the national interest determined what the strategic doctrine
was to prove to be while itself being a component of the stra-
tegic doctrine. This strategic doctrine of the United States
government; elected of, by and for the people, will take what-
ever economic, political, judicial or military actions are
deemed to be in the best interest of the United States, that
is, actions that are perceived as being possible, necessary
and acceptable to ensure the continued existence and prosperity
of our:
1) democratic principles and system of government,
2) economic growth and well-being,
3) physical safety and well-being, and
4) our non-secular, but religiose system.
11

All of these national interests are directly related
to what President Woodrow Wilson was to come to entitle the
Four Freedoms:
- Freedom of Speech and Expression,
- Freedom of Worship,
- Freedom from Want, and
- Freedom from Fear.
In this interpretation, the strategic doctrine is based
on the national interest in the sense that the national inter-
est is defined more concretely in the context of the strategic
doctrine. The doctrine defines the interests, and the interests
determine the doctrine. In this manner the two concepts are
incorporated into an inseparable entity: the one is bound up
in the other.
2 . The National Interest
The postulation of the national interest is similar
to a list derived by George F. Kennan. To Kennan, the first
interest was in the physical security of the United States.
Physical well-being and survival is the prime interest of a
state. This is best shown by his statement about state in-
terests and activities that,
The first and most obvious (interest) was that one ought
to protect the physical intactness of our national life
from any external military or political intrusion— in
other words, that one ought to look to the national se-
curity— for only in the absence of hostile foreign inter-
ference could these processes, in the usefulness of which
we believed, be given full freedom to operate .
3
3George F. Kennan, "The Two Planes of International
Reality" , in The Puritan Ethic in United States Foreign
12

This statement shows that to Kennan, the first interest
of the United States was to the "continued existence and pros-
perity of our democratic principles and system of government,
(and)... physical safety and well-being" of both the citizenry
and of the nation. Kennan continues in this vein of thought
when he suggests that to protect that system we need to take
other affirmative actions. He stated:
Secondly, one could see to it that insofar as the acti-
vities of our citizens in pursuit of their private in-
terests spilled over beyond our borders and into the
outside world, the best possible arrangements were made
to promote and protect them.
4
Kennan here evinces the historic desire and attempts
by the United States to promote and protect our "economic
growth and well-being" and it also relates to the protection
of the "physical safety and well-being" of the citizenry while
so engaged. Historically, and according to Kennan, we can
see the interests of the United States taking shape along the
lines already established by the strategic doctrine.
Kennan hinted at what was also to prove to be an inter-
est of the United States in a statement concerning the moral
quality of Americans. Most Americans tend to perceive the
United States as an inherently moral state and that if a truly
Policy , ed. David L. Larson (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van




moral American perspective could be used in the field of
international relations, problems could more adequately be
solved. He postulated:
Problems could then be solved not with regard to the
ugly political realities of the moment but strictly
on the basis of general norms of state behaviour, laid
down and accepted in advance. All that was needed was
the framework, and this we Americans were eminently
equipped to provide ... (W) e saw ourselved moving bene-
volently, helpfully among the waiting peoples of the
world... our virtues no longer just the virtues of the
American frontier but the virtues of the world at large.
5
This was not only an "interest" in preserving the Amer-
ican moral value system, but it was a crusade to promote it
as a self-evident good to the less fortunate peoples of the
world. While this would seem to take the "interest" of our
value system a step further than preservation or protection,
it does not invalidate the concept for two reasons. First,
since it was perceived as the most beneficent value system
to be in existence, it was therefore the mission of the Amer-
icans to expand and promote it for the benefit of all. Se-
condly, if it is viewed as being necessary to promote and
expand the American moral value system in order to preserve
it from attack by "baser" value systems that are in competi-
tion with it around the world, then the difference becomes
one of tactics and not of what the national interest actually
is. In this case, the best defense against moral incursion
5 Ibid. p. 34.
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would be an aggressive, missionary attitude to spread the
benefits of a superior system. In other words, the best de-
fense is a good offense. The national interest is still in
the preservation of the American moral value system, however,
the strategy and tactics involved are the proselytization of
that value system to ensure its' preservation.
This is where it becomes important to note the neces-
sary distinction between national interests, the goals that
they establish through the interactions of forces, and the
various strategies created and tactics used to accomplish those
goals. The levels of analysis must remain distinct to prevent
confusion when discussing the national interest.
It is also extremely important that one not confuse
strategy with the strategic doctrine. Strategy is a plan de-
signed to achieve the goals established in the policy (foreign
or domestic) that is based on the strategic doctrine and nation-
al interest. Policy then is the means of achieving the goals
established in the strategic doctrine and by the national in-
terest. Policy also entails layers of strategy, grand strategy
being the culmination of the economic, political, military
and judicial strategies that are, when combined, the grand
strategy. Grand strategy, then, is the means of achieving
the goals that were set by policy. It is possible, then, with
this interconnecting system to have strategy, grand strategy
and policy as means and goals at the same time, all due to
the complex inter-relationships of this system.
15

B. FOREIGN POLICY AS A PRODUCT OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST
The national interests of the United States determined
by the experiences of the early colonists, were stated in
written form many ways, perhaps the best of which were the
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. From these
documents we cull the national interest and form it into a
strategic doctrine that encompasses both the national inter-
est and the means and methods available to achieve them, al-
beit in a vague, general format. It is then for the elected
leaders of the country to institute methods to best achieve
those goals (the national interest) . The methods for achieving
them are the policy. The method (means) of achieving the pol-
icy (goal) is then the strategy. The means to achieve the
strategy become tactics. It it through this chain of goals
and means that the national interest is achieved. The idea
that the national interest changes with each administration
is false. What actually changes are the means used to achieve
those same goals. Where President Kennedy dealt with the Carib-
bean through his Alliance for Prosperity, the Nixon Administra-
tion used a policy of Benign Neglect. Both presidents wanted
a Caribbean sympathetic to the United States, but they attempted
to achieve it in different manners. The common thread that
runs throughout is the national interest and foreign policy.
In any discussion of the national interest it seems inevi-
table that the discussion eventually become one of the foreign
16

policy of the United States. In a sense, this is natural.
Any consideration of the national interest should of neces-
sity revolve around foreign policy. Considering that the
national interest is the goal to be achieved, then the means
of achieving that goal, foreign policy, become intermixed,
almost to seeming interchangeability . While semantically the
terms remain separate and distinct, in the minds of people
using them they are the same. As an example, if the national
interest of preserving the physical safety and well-being of
the citizens of the United States is the topic of discussion,
such a discussion soon evolves into a consideration of the
foreign policy concerning that subject. The topic has not
essentially changed even though the level of analysis has
shifted from a national interest to a method or means of
achieving that interest.
George F. Kennan discussed the need for foreign policy
and its application to the national interest in the following
terms that sum up this contradiction:
The conduct of foreign relations ought not to be conceived
as a purpose in itself for a political society, but rather
as one of the means by which some higher and more compre-
hensive purpose is pursued. By this I mean that a politi-
cal society does not live to conduct foreign policy, it
would be more correct to say that it conducts foreign poli-
cy in order to live. Surely, the essential and important
thing in the life of our own state is not what we do with
regard to other nations but what happens right here among
us, on this American territory for which we are responsible
Our foreign policy, in short, is only a means to an end.
17

And that end must consist in whatever we consider to be
the general objects of American society.
6
When this contradiction is related to the national inter-
est, we see that foreign policy is inseparable from those in-
terests in that it is the means to achieve them.
C. ELEMENTS AFFECTING AMERICAN POLICY DECISIONS
American foreign policy, determined by the leaders of the
country, based on the national interest, is not formed in a
vacuum. There are many forces acting to influence the final
decisions. These may be in the realm of the requirements of
a prioritization of interests, resolution of the conflicting
appeals of idealism and realism, determining what is in the
best interest of the country, or the ameliorization of Presi-
dential, Congressional and Public opinion. All of these areas
need to be considered in each and every foreign policy decision.
1 . Hierarchy of Interests
On occasion, it may become necessary to forego the
complete satisfaction of one interest in order to fully ac-
complish the goals established by another interest. In these
cases, it becomes necessary to establish a hierarchy of inter-
ests. While it is difficult and risky to apply a theory of
interpersonal relationships to the international scene, the
application of Maslow's Hierarchy appears to conform to state
behavior. Maslow postulated a hierarchy of needs, one requiring
Kennan, Puritan Ethic, p. 26
18

satisfaction before another is desired. The basic need is
Physiological. This, for an individual is the need for phy-
sical survival. For a state, this would equate to the con-
tinued existence of the state. As such, it means that the
state "will take whatever economic, political, judicial or
military actions are deemed to be in the best interest of the
United States". This equates to survival. The national in-
terests stem from this basic need to preserve the nation.
The second need is the Safety need. In people this
equates to a predictable world and freedom within limits. On
the state level this would be a desire to preserve the prin-
ciples and government of the individual citizens.
Once that is met, the third need, Belonginess can be
striven for. For a person, this can be seen as a desire for
a place in his group. A state would strive for a niche in
the international system. This niche can be on political,
military or economic levels.
The fourth need is the Esteem need. On the personal
level this is equated to self-respect and esteem from others.
A state may also strive for this. It can be seen in the diplo-
matic areas and in alignments of other nations on issues of
importance to that nation.
The fifth, and last, need is Self-Actualization. In
an individual it becomes a desire for growth. On a state level
it could be attempts at proselytizing their particular brand
of state system to other states.
19

While a state may be at any of these five levels, if
a threat is perceived to a lower need, actions to protect the
lower need will be taken while forsaking the higher level need.
This can be seen in many relations, but most especially when
the physical security of a state is threatened. All other
activities are forgotten in the effort to preserve the state.
When dealing with states, this hierarchy needs to be kept in
mind so as to understand why actions are taken, or what actions
to take
.
Also of consideration are what Maslow termed the pre-
conditions for need satisfaction, freedom, justice, orderli-
ness and a challenge or stimulation. The growth of international
organizations has evidenced the desire for freedom, justice
and orderliness and the economic competition of the market
place is one of these many stimuli.
While there is not a direct transference of Maslow
from individual behavior to state behavior, there are enough
similarities to establish that a hierarchy of interests does
exist and that if pressure exists that will not allow the
achievement of all goals, then an ordering process takes place
so as to achieve what would be considered maximum advantage
For a short and concise summation of Maslow' s Hierarchy
see Frank G. Guble, The Third Force: The Psychology of
Abraham Maslow
, with a Forward by Abraham Maslow (New York:
Grossman Publishers, 1970), pp. 36-51.
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from the situation based on the hierarchy of interests. An
excellent example is a comment made by Ernst B. Haas:
Nations will not dedicate themselves to working for
human rights and physical welfare until their military
security is assured.
8
2 . Realism and Idealism
In all attempts at realization of the goals established
by various policies, policies which are based on the national
interest and guided by the strategic doctrine, the United States
is caught in a dilemma of implementation. As such, the United
States can maneuver between the opposite poles of realism (in
the sense of constraints forced by political, military, econom-
ic, technological and manpower considerations) and idealism
(in the sense of constraints established by our value system
and culture that reflect the Judeo-Christian heritage and demo-
cratic ideas and goals such as are reflected in the Declaration
of Independence) . Historically it appears that there is a
continuum between these two poles that is traversed in both
designing and implementing policy. The United States emerges
as a nation that maneuvers between the forces of realism and
idealism while never acting exclusively in terms of one force
or the other, that is, a country which is influenced by elastic
forces that simultaneously attempt to pull us to the one extreme
gErnst B. Haas, Beyond The Nation-State (Stanford, Cali-
fornia: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 31.
21

while preventing the other extreme from achieving dominance.
In a sense, it is similar to a constant tug-of-war between
equally matched forces in which momentary advantage may be
gained, but no complete victory of one over the other can be
achieved. These elastic forces can readily be represented
by the concepts that symbolize these opposing poles. The
forces that attract us to idealism would be our Judeo-Christian
heritage, the concepts of morality and justice, and American
concept of "fair play" while the forces that attract us to
realism would be an instinct and demand for the continued sur-
vival and maintenance of our economic, political, judicial,
religiose system and for the maintenance, if not improvement,
of the American way of life and standard of living (public
opinion being susceptible to either extreme) . While these
are not mutually exclusive concepts they can lead to similar
solutions in one case, while being divergent in another. It
is the constant interplay of these forces that determines the
United States response to any particular situation. As the
strength of each concept varies over time and in each situa-
tion, there can be no exact statement as to where the United
States will stand on this continuum in each instance. The
United States is constantly pulled back and forth between the
forces of realism and idealism based on interactions and events
in the national and international system. It does seem, how-
ever that as one force gains dominance it is modified by the




As examples of these forces and their influence we
examine the Cuban Missile Crisis and President Carter Human
Rights Campaign. The Cuban Missile Crisis is an example of
idealism and realism being in concert as to a solution, but
for widely varying reasons. The President Carter Human Rights
Campaign is an example of idealism and realism being at con-
tradictory extremes with only one solution being applicable
at a time
.
With the placement of IRBM's and MRBM's in Cuba, the
Kennedy Administration was faced with a situation that was
perceived to be a threat to the physical security of the United
States. Historically, the United States had been able to in-
tervene both diplomatically and militarily in Caribbean affairs.
This new consideration of a Soviet response to an action against
a client state was a new consideration. The options that pre-
sented themselves were: ignore it, surgical air strikes, inva-
sion of Cuba, and, eventually, blockade. The option of ignoring
the missiles was immediately rejected on idealistic and realistic
grounds. Idealistically it was considered immoral to allow
the United States populace to be placed at such an imminent
risk and realistically it could dramatically shift the balance-
of-power. An invasion was ruled out as it would be morally
unjustified without Cuba actually threatening the United States
and realistically because it could precipitate launch of the
missiles it was supposed to eliminate. It appeared that an
air strike would be the selected alternative despite the moral
23

implications of an American President as another Tojo and a
"Pearl Harbor in reverse", as Robert Kennedy termed it, un-
til the realistic consideration that an air strike could not
be assured of 100% success and the remaining missiles could
launch brought that option to a stop. The option of a block-
ade proved to be idealistically and realistically acceptable
and was eventually the choice. Idealistically it was morally
acceptable as no force needed to be used unless the United
States was forced to. Realistically it took advantage of
United States strategic naval superiority to force a solution
9from the Soviet Union and Cuba.
In the second case, President Carter's inital stand,
and subsequent foreign policy, on human rights was predicated
on the idealism of President Carter. While initially the poli-
cy was applauded for its recognition of what America stood
for and as a means of achieving human rights goals around the
world, it came to be perceived as having an adverse effect
on the situation, particularly with respect to relations with
many Latin American countries. Idealistically, most Americans
were appalled by the authoritarian regimes of many of the Uni-
ted States' allies or supporters and it was an easy matter
9For further discussion of the decision-making process
involved in the Cuban Missile Crisis see Graham T. Allison,
Essence of Decision: Explaining The Cuban Missile Crisis
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971).
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to focus upon the American ideals of freedom that were lacking
in those countries. As time passed, it was perceived by the
public that not only was the policy failing to "democratize"
these areas, but was costing the United States the support
of many countries which resented this interference into domes-
tic affairs. W. Scott Thompson summarized the public response
The American public, sympathetic to Jimmy Carter's exper-
iment but tempered by the experiences of a second oil
shock, genocide in Southeast Asia, occupation in Afghan-
istan, bloody proxy wars in Africa, aggressive combat
brigades ninety miles from Miami, and national humilia-
tion in Teheran, rejected this idealistic approach in
the 1980 election with a decisive confirmation of a new
realism. 10
This shift from idealism to realism was in response to a per-
ceived movement to an extreme, which was unacceptable and,
therefore, countered.
Many writers have covered the concepts of idealism
and realism. While all have seen these concepts as valid,
not all agree as to affect on policy. Reinhold Niebuhr seems
to feel that while idealism exists, it has little affect on
foreign policy:
The idealists .. .must always remain a minority group. In
the past they have not been strong enough to affect the
actions of nations and have had to content themselves with
a policy of dissociation from the nation in times of crisis,
W. Scott Thompson, "The Third World Revisited", in
The Third World: Premises of U.S. Policy , Revised Edition,
ed. W. Scott Thompson (San Francisco: Institute for Con-
temporary Studies, 1983), p. 6.
25

when national ambitions were in sharpest conflict with
their moral ideals.
H
While initially this may seem to contradict the idea of the
public not allowing extreme swings, he is concerning himself
with crisis situations only. While policy may move to an ex-
treme during the crisis, it always is adjusted when the crisis
has passed. This supports the roles of idealism and realism
as balancing forces. Hans J. Morgenthau sees the presence
and the balancing accomplished by realism and idealism, or
as he terms it; "political realism":
Political realism does not require, nor does it condone
indifference to political ideals and moral principles,
but it requires indeed a sharp distinction between the
desirable and the possible—between what is desirable
everywhere and at all times and what is possible under
the concrete circumstances of time and place... (it)
represents the theoretical construct of a rational
foreign policy which experience can never completely
acb "i pvp . 12
>re <
:h e e . l«
Morgenthau continues in the same vein when he comments further





(This) does not imply disregard for the existence and
importance of... other modes of thought. It rather implies
Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Morality of Nations," in The
Puritan Ethic in United States Foreign Policy , ed. David
L. Larson (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1966),
pp. 84-85.
12Hans J. Morgenthau, "A Realist Theory of International
Politics," in The Puritan Ethic in United State Foreign
Policy
, ed. David L. Larson (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand
Company, Inc., 1966) pp. 66-6 7.
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that each should be assigned its proper sphere and function.
Political realism is based upon a pluralistic conception
of human nature. A man who was nothing but 'political man'
would be a beast, for he would be completely lacking in
moral restraints. A man who was nothing but 'moral man'
would be a fool, for he would be completely lacking in
prudence . 13
And so it also would be in the foreign relations of the United
States if either extreme were to be chosen. Edward Hallett
Carr makes a similar argument in that idealism is an essen-
tial part of any political decision:
Consistent realism excludes four things which appear to
be essential ingredients of all effective political think-
ing: a finite goal, an emotional appeal, a right of moral
judgement, and a ground for action... The necessity, recog-
nized by all politicians, both in domestic and international
affairs, for cloaking interests in a guise of moral prin-
ciples is in itself a symptom of the inadequacy of realism.
Most of all, consistent realism, breaks down because it
fails to provide any ground for purposive or meaningful
action. 14
Carr makes this contention that idealism and realism are an
essential mix in all relations when he makes the following
statement:
Any sound political thought must be based on elements of
both Utopia and reality. Here, then, is the complexity,
the fascination and the tradegy of all political life.
Politics are made up of two elements—Utopia and reality
—
belonging to two different planes which can never meet.
Every political situation contains mutually incompatible
13 Ibid. p. 74.
14 Edward Hallett Carr, "The Limitations of Realism", in
The Puritan Ethic in United States Foreign Policy , ed. David




elements of Utopia and reality, of morality and power.
Political action must be based on a coordination of
morality and power. 15
Dean Acheson proposes that a mix of realism and idealism is
essential in foreign policy, but that a shift to an extreme
would be harmful to the best interests of all.
The righteous who seek to deduce foreign policy from
ethical or moral principles are as misleading and as
misled as the moderm Machiavelli ' s who would conduct
our foreign relations without regard to them. ...The
conduct of diplomacy should conform to the same moral
and ethical principles which inspire trust and confi-
dence when followed by and between individuals... but
if we have an excess of moral or ethical enthusiasm or
idealism, let us not try to find an outlet for it in
the formulation of foreign policies. 16
This emphasis away from idealism as the major force in for-
eign policy formulation is also espoused by Kenneth Thomp-
son. He feels that "simple moralism" is not enough to base
decisions on in the complicated field of international
relations
:
Any moral choice involves decisions in a complicated and
ever-shifting field of action. The same course of action
that under one set of circumstances may be moral, in another
may be quite immoral. To sort out the moral elements in
each successive crisis is the task of statemanship, and sim-
ple moralism is more often an impediment than guide. 17
15 Ibid. pp. 103-106.
16
Dean Acheson, "Ethics in International Relations Today,"
in The Puritan Ethic in United States Foreign Policy , ed. David
L. Larson (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1966),
pp. 131-132, 138.
17Kenneth Thompson, " Judeo-Christian Realism: The Cold
War and the Search for Relevant Norms," in The Puritan Ethic
In United States Foreign Policy , ed. David L. Larson (Princeton
D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1966), p. 121.
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While all of these authors deal with realism and ideal-
ism in slightly different ways, they all seem to feel that
realism and idealism, for better or worse, play a major role
in foreign policy formulation in the United States. Any at-
tempts at policy formulation must take these two forces into
account in order to successfully design foreign policy.
3 . Self-Interest
It is self-interest that motivates states to take the
actions that they do. It was unequivocally put by Alexander
Hamilton that:
It may be affirmed as a general principle, that the pre-
dominant motive of good offices from one nation to another,
is in the interest or advantage of the nation which per-
forms them. . . good offices which are indifferent to the
interest of a nation performing them, or which are compen-
sated by the existence or expectation of some reasonable
equivalent, or which produce an essential good to the na-
tion to which they are rendered, without real detriment to
the affairs of the benefactors, prescribe perhaps the limits
of national generosity or benevolence ... 18
It is this aspect of self-interest that can be seen
as a major force in the relations between the United States
and the Caribbean; they, and we, act in self-interest and not
necessarily on altruistic reasons. The Caribbean nations are
interested in the United States as the potential benefactor/
potential interventionist to the north. The United States
is where they can receive assistance with their economies,
18 Richard B. Morris, ed. Alexander Hamilton and The




possibly at the expense of United States interference in their
internal economic and political affairs. The Caribbean nations
are concerned with what they see as the inequitable terms of
trade that exist between them and the industrialized world.
They feel that as long as they are paid little for their raw
materials and have to buy expensive manufactured items from
outside the area, they can never develop as industrializing
countries in order to improve their present economic situation.
As long as the economic conditions remain as they are, they
cannot hope to remove themselves from their tradionally vio-
19lent political changes. The United States, on the other
hand, is interested in the area for a variety of reasons, eco-
nomic, geostrategic , and as a matter of prestige, to name a
few. It becomes apparent, then, that the United States, moti-
vated by more than idealistic reasons, will act within the
parameter of the realism-idealism context. The nation will
act in its own self-interest within the confines of what is
realistically feasible and idealistically acceptable. For
a nation to behave in a manner that is not conducive to its
own interest is an anomaly. This was emphasized by Alexander
Hamilton when he stated:
Self preservation is the first duty of a nation and though
in the performance of stipulations pertaining to war, good
19 This position is currently held by many Third World
countries. In the Latin American region, Raul Prebisch
appears to be a leading advocate of this position.
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faith requires that its ordinary hazards should be fairly
met, because they are directly contemplated by such stip-
ulations, yet it does not require that extraordinary ha-
zards should be run... An individual may, on numerous
occasions, meritoriously indulge the emotions of generosity
and benevolence, not only without an eye to, but even at
the expense of, his own interest. But a government can
rarely, if at all, be justifiable in pursuing a similar
course; and if it does so, ought to confine itself within
much stricter bounds. 20
While it can be shown that nations do sometimes appar-
ently involve themselves in endeavors that to others appear
counter-productive, is that sufficient evidence to assume that
they are no longer acting in their own self-interest? We
should be alert not to apply our standards onto other nations'
policies. Applying our standards to different nation's choices
of action, while providing an answer, does not take their stra-
tegic doctrine and national interest into account. We have
to realize that the history and culture of each nation will
determine its own, as it sees it, appropriate response to each
circumstance. As an example, to an American it would appear
ludricrous that a nation, such as Cuba, would willingly alien-
ate a world power that is located a mere ninety miles away.
In effect, this strategy was a calculated response to what
Castro perceived as the absorption of the Cuban economy by
the United States, and would give Castro a free hand to re-
organize Cuba along the lines that he envisaged. Castro
realized that to achieve this system he would assuredly enrage
20Morris, Alexander Hamilton, p. 409.
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the United States industries and capitalists that were present
in the country (and which had invested millions of dollars
of capital in the Cuban economy) when he nationalized their
assets. This was sure to incur the wrath of the United States,
but it was seen as a necessary step in achieving Cuban economic
goals. While it may have seemed more logical to us to have
continued courting the economic giant to the north, Castro
felt that his objectives could not be met in that manner. It
was, therefore, in the best self-interest of Cuba to proceed
in its economic plan as Castro envisaged it should be.
In summary, all states act in their own self-interest,
and that is no less than as it should be. The nation that
fails to act in its own self-interest will inevitably cease
to function, perhaps even cease to exist. As the citizens
of a nation fully and correctly expect the nation (i.e., the
government of that nation) to behave in a manner which will
maximize benefits to that nation, it is essential that the
actions of that nation take its own self-interest into con-
sideration first and foremost. While these decisions may in-
volve reverses for some, it is survival and the general welfare
of the nation that is the dominant consideration. According
to Morgenthau:
The individual may say for himself: Fiat justitia, pereat
mundus: (Let justice be done, even if the world perishes),
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but the state has no right to say so in the name of
those who are in its care. 21
4 . Influences of Opinion: Presidential , Congressional
Public
Professor Donald Nuecterlein, when he established his
model of Presidential decision-making and the national inter-
est, performed a service to the field of political science.
He provides a method of objectively analyzing a problem re-
garding the national interest effects on foreign policy deci-
22
sions. The disadvantage to the system is that it operates
in a vacuum. Professor Nuecterlein acknowledges the influence
of Congress and the public mood, but does not allow them ac-
cess to the system. To fully analyze these areas requires
the same system as was applied to Presidential decision-making
with the additional interplay of forces between areas. It
is obvious that Congress can thwart any foreign policy ini-
tiative of the Executive Branch if it so desires (Congress
has several ways in which to do so: treaty ratification in
the Senate, budget approval and appropriations, the War Powers
Act, etc.). This must be considered by the Executive. The
Public must also be considered in any decision. While the
21Hans J. Morgenthau , "A Realist Theory of International
Politics," in The Puritan Ethic in United States Foreign
Policy , ed. David L. Larson (Princeton: D. Von Nostrand
Company, Inc., 1966), p. 70.
22For a complete analysis of this decision-making system
read Donald E. Nuecterlein, National Interests and Presiden-




public (the attentive public) does not have the official powers
of the Legislative Branch, it does have the very formidable
weapon of public opinion. The public can cause its will to
be considered through the constant threat of future elections,
be they Congressional or Presidential. With the Congressional
system of rotating elections there will always be someone up
for re-election every two years. Public pressure can thereby
be exerted on the President in terms of re-election, or even
on a President in his second term, through pressure on Congress-
men that are up for re-election and through them, pressure
on the decisions of the Presidency. These interrelationships
are very dependent on the strength of attitudes in each sector.
Professor Nuecterlein divided interests into four attitudinal
areas: Survival, Vital, Major and Peripheral. While these
were sufficient for analyzing only Presidential decisions,
it is insufficient for an analysis of the interplay of forces
between areas. To adequately analyze this interrelationship,
the following intensity attitudes apply: Survival, Vital, Major,
Minor and Apathy. This allows for a better analysis of the
relationships between forces (although it does not overtly
consider power politics, bargaining and compromise made in
each sector, the final attitude is the result of those aspects
of decision-making). As an example, if the Executive Branch
takes the position on an issue as being Vital, then to be over-
ruled, the system would require that at least one of the other




also for the other group to reach the dominant position. This
can also be accomplished through one group having a higher
attitudinal position, but in a different category.
A categorization of the national interest would give
the following basic interests:
- Physical Security/Defense
- Economic Security
- Ideological Security/Preservation of Value System
- Psychological Security/Favorable World Order
Each of these areas may have a different level of intensity
of attitude in a given situation and the interplay of these
forces will determine the outcome.
An example of this interplay can be shown through the
Cuban Missile Crisis. Initially, only the Executive knew of
the Soviet IRBM's and MRBM's deployed to Cuba, therefore, the
intensity of attitudes was markedly different. Whereas the
Executive would place Cuba at the Survival level concerning
Defense, the Legislative would have placed it at the Minor
level (despite Congressional concern over the military aspects
of Cuba) , while the Public perceived little threat and placed
it on the Apathy level (since while there was some public con-
cern over the Cuban military, it did not play an important
role in the issues of the day) . Since there were no real con-
cerns about an economic threat from Cuba, the Executive and
Legislative placed Cuba at the Minor level, while the Public
placed it at the Apathy level. The Public appeared to be equally
concerned on the issues of Ideology and World Order. While
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the Executive placed World Order at the Survival level and
Ideology at the Vital level due to its special knowledge, the
Legislative placed Ideology on a Major level and World Order
on a Minor level. On a chart it would appear as follows:
Intensity of Attitude
Survival Vital Major Minor Apathy
Basic Interest :
Defense EXEC - - LEG PUB
Economic - - EXEC PUB
LEG
Ideology - EXEC LEG - PUB
World Order EXEC - - LEG PUB
After it was announced by President Kennedy that the
Soviets had placed offensive nuclear weapons in Cuba, the Atti-
tudes shifted drastically with respect to the Legislative and
Public, while the Attitude of the Executive remained as it
had been since it had already been privy to the information.
The Leaislative and Public shifted dramatically to the left
on the scale in all areas except Economic.
While this showed that there was now a concurrence
of opinion on the problem, it in no way offered a solution
to the problem. It did, however, provide the Executive with
more freedom of action since it became a Survival level pro-
blem and all groups concurred. This gave the Executive a full
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Intensity of Attitude :















range of options, up to and including war. If any of the groups
had not perceived of the problem as a Survival issue, then
this range of options would be reduced. It is this interplay
of the groups that determines the bounds in which the responses
may be formulated. While it does not determine the policy
outcome, it does show the relationship of opinions throughout
the three groups.
5 . Summation
When considering the national interest and, thereby,
the foreign policy of the United States, it is essential to
consider all of the previous aspects that affect foreign pol-
icy decisions. It is with this in mind that we analyze, first,
some of the threats to the national interest of the United
States and, secondly, recommendations for action to provide
outcomes in the best interest of the United States.
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III. CARIBBEAN RESOURCES AND TRADE ROUTES
A. RESOURCES
The Caribbean is of direct interest to the Unites States
in the sense that it is not only a provider of the resources
that are necessary to maintain the economic growth and well-
being of the United States, but it is also a nexus of the many
trade routes that are directly or indirectly connected to the
area. It indirectly becomes an interest in the areas of phy-
sical safety and protection of the United States when consi-
deration is given to the strategic quality of the resources
that are necessary to the defense establishment. As a subset
of this, if the people and government are threatened, so too
would be our value system, as our chief opponents' beliefs
commonly are the antithesis of our own.
1 . Mineral and Resource Dependence
The extent to which the United States is dependent
on the rest of the world varies, but there is a consensus that
a dependency does exist. Congressman Frank Church has admitted
as much in a study done by Congress in stating:
Although the United States is blessed with a wealth of
natural resources, all of these resources are not avail-
able in equally abundant quantities. Furthermore, there
are simply many materials for which we do not possess
significant reserves. Thus, for better or worse, we have
come to depend upon foreign countries to supply many of
38

2 3the resources which sustain our technological society.
Minerals availability is essential to the economic well-being
and military preparedness of any nation. Without the flow
of minerals, industry would come to a virtual standstill.
Without industry there can be no tanks, planes, missiles or
any other weapons production with which to defend the country.
As an example, the requirements to support the MX Missile pro-
gram alone call for 10,000 tons of aluminum, 24 tons of beryl-
lium, 2,500 tons of chromium, 150 tons of titanium, 890,000
24tons of steel and 2.4 million tons of cement. All of these,
to a lesser or greater extent, come from minerals which the
United States has to import.
In a similar study conducted by Congress in critical
mineral needs, the problem of providing minerals to the economy
were noted.
No issue facing America in the decades ahead poses the risks
and dangers to the nation economy and defense presented by
this Nation's dependence on foreign sources for strategic
and critical minerals. America is now dependent on foreign
sources in excess of 50 percent for 24 of the 32 minerals
essential to national survival. 25
23U.S. Congress, Senate. "Imports of Minerals From South
Africa By The United States and the OECD Countries", Prepared
for the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on
Foreign Relations, 96th Congress, 2nd Session, September 1980.
p. III.
24
The Raw Materials Group, "Raw Materials for the MX Missile",
Raw Materials Report, Vol. 1 No. 1, p. 7.
25U.S. Congress, House. "Sub-Sahara Africa: It's Role in
Critical Mineral Needs of the Western World", Committee Print
No. 8, A Report Prepared by the Subcommittee on Mines and
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Many stress the cataclysmic results of a cut-off of
minerals to the United States. Congressman David Marriott
has stated that "our nation is facing a resource crisis poten-
tially more devastating than any that could arise from a short-
26
age of petroleum." Mr. E. F. Andrews, a spokesman for the
United States metals industry and Vice-President of Allegheny
Ludlum Industries, speaking just of the minerals imported from
South Africa has said that
we would have to revert 40-50 years in our standard of
living and technology if deprived of the minerals and
metals of South and Southern Africa. Without these stra-
tegic metals, all production of steel, aircraft, missiles,
tanks, naval vessels, automobiles and weapons of all kinds
would cease. 27
To determine if these dismal predictions were valid, the Sub-
committee on African Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee commissioned a study by the Congressional Research
Service of the Library of Congress. While this study dealt
only with South Africa, the results could be generalized since
a large portion of United States mineral imports come from
that area. The study concluded that
means are available for dealing with an interruption.
These means may be costly, and they cannot in all cases
be implemented without disruption. But, in general, the
disruptions can be minimized if preparations for a
Mining of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 96th
Congress, 2nd Session, July 1980. p. VII.
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possible cut-of f . . .are made in advance.
Advance preparations suggested include stockpiling, con-
servation, process changes, alternative technologies,
use of functionally acceptable substitutes where possible,
providing incentives to encourage design changes, recycling,
and exploiting untapped reserves. 28
While this may sound heartening, in reality it is a
glossing over of the difficulties that would be encountered.
All of these solutions, while feasible in the long run, will
not account for any short term deficiencies, especially if
the United States is involved in hostilities anywhere.
Stockpiling has long been the solution offered as the
best means of protection against mineral cut-off. The problem
with that is that the stockpiling program of the United States
is nowhere centrally coordinated and controlled. It is at
best a hodgepodge of departments and bureaus. Captain Bruce
P. Schoch, U.S. Army (Ret) illustrated that very point.
Our traditional answer has been to stockpile key mater-
ials that we would need to survive, with the goal of
surviving for a relatively short period while cut off
from traditional supplies.
Little attention has been paid, however, to the nation-
al defense stockpile since 1959, when it assumed its
present configuration. 29
With no central control there can be no responsibility assigned
30With a lack of responsibility comes a lack of action.
28 Ibid, p. XI.
29Bruce P. Schoch, "Elements of Power: U.S. Behind the
Eight Ball", Army, April, 1983, p. 51.
As of 1979 only 40 percent of the materials contained
in the national stockpile were meeting their stated goals.
Another 10 percent of materials met their goals only by credits
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Stockpiling is not the answer to the problem, unless serious
reforms are made and continuing effort is made to stock it
and keep it out of political disputes. A sample listing of
stockpiled minerals and their percentage requirements held
follows:














Manganese (chemical grade) 91
Manganese ore (metallurgical) 177
Manganese (ferro, high carbon) 136
Mercury 370
Nickel
Platinum group (indium) 17






Tungsten ores, concentrates 1,176
Vanadium (ferro)
Zinc 28
from materials that are held in the stockpile in other forms
such as bauxite and aluminum. A total of 43 material categories
were below their states goals, 13 of which were below the 20
percent stockpile requirement levels. From Bohdan 0. Szuprowich,
How To Avoid Strategic Materials Shortages: Dealing With Cartels,
Embargoes, and Supply Disruptions . (New York: John Wiley and





Conservation is more of an aid to keeping costs down
than in actually handling a crisis. If the crisis comes, con-
servation will be an essential part of any effort to keep in-
dustry functioning. Currently conservation is usually practiced
as a matter of profit. Waste is expensive and in a profit-
oriented society it is usually discouraged by the profit motive.
It in all probability could be improved upon in a crisis.
Process changes usually come about over the course
of time as factors of production change. This can also be
said of alternative technologies. In any event, changeover
s
are usually costly and time-consuming. Process changes are
not answers to a short-term situation, but would be in the
long-run.
The use of functionally acceptable alternatives also
sounds like a possible solution until you examine what miner-
als have a ready substitute. The following is a sample list
of strategic materials whose cutoff could be critical, the
possibility of a ready substitute being available and the rela-































From this relatively short list of materials it is evident
that substitutability is of very questionable value. In areas
where there are substitutes available, it is usually at a cost
of a degradation in the quality of the end product. While
there may be more ways to develop substitutes, industry will
not attempt to discover new methods to any great degree unless
they perceive it as being either more economical to do so or
are forced to through actual shortages. In an economically
competitive system, such as ours, substitutability is not a
short-term solution.
Providing incentives to encourage design changes is
actually the function of the market place. The consumers in-
dicate their demands and producers respond as best as possible
with available materials and capital. In the event of a mater-
ial shortage, the demand will cause further research into re-
placements or substitutes. This, however, is an after the
fact solution. Who then is to provide the incentives to en-
couraqe changes? In these times of record budget deficits
it is unlikely that the government will undertake what would,
in all likelihood, become a very expensive program. The
32Bruce P. Schoch, "Elements of Power: U.S. Behind the
Eight Ball," Army , April 1983, p. 52.
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consumers are unlikely to demand change in advance of a mater-
ials shortage and the industries, while they all are involved
in research and development to varying degrees, will probably
not massively invest in alternatives research without the pro-
mise of compensation. Again, research will not compensate
for shortages in the short-run.
Recycling should be put into even greater effect than
it currently involves. Many metals and materials are now being
recycled, but much more can be done. Recycling would prove
beneficial in offsetting supply shortages, but it would in
no way replace the lost materials.
Efforts to exploit untapped reserves usually sounds
promising, but again there are problems. The reason that many
reserves are untapped is simply because it has not been econo-
mically feasible to exploit them. Access has in turn led to
the problem of processing the ores. Since many materials are
now provided by foreign countries, the United States capability
to process ores has diminished. With the development of mines
in other countries came the associated development of process-
ing plants. The United States has now become dependent on
the import of processed materials and the capabilities of the
United States has diminished in that area. Thus, even if these
untapped reserves exist, United States mining and processing
capabilities would not be adequate to replace many lost materials
With these considerations in mind, the assumptions
made previously become very questionable. The United States,
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in the face of a cut-off from foreign materials, will face
a major problem that will engender massive dislocation in
coping with that cut-off.
Considering this, what then are to be considered stra-
tegic or critical materials to the United States? Bohdan
Szuprowicz defines it as follows.
If there exists the possibility of a severe shortage or
outright supply disruption of a material that cannot be
readily substituted in an industry then it must be con-
sidered as being strategic or critical to the end-users.
This is particularly true if such a material originates
from foreign sources outside the political control of
the country in which end-users and their industries are
located. 33
The actual analysis of how difficult materials are used will
follow, but the amount of dependence of the United States
needs to be determined. It has been warned that
we have become dangerously dependent upon foreign sources
for a preponderance of strategic materials vital to our
basic industries.
The most heavily industrialized nation in the world, the
United States, is literally dependent upon the rest of
the world, and in particular on some of the most unstable
regions, for its basic minerals, with which to feed those
industries . 34
This' is based on an analysis of the percentage of import de-
pendencies that exists over a wide range of minerals currently
used in United States industry. A list of some key raw mater-
35lals and United States dependency follows:
33Bohdan Szuprowicz, How To Avoid Strategic Materials Short-
ages: Dealing With Cartels, Embargoes, And Supply Disruptions
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1981) p. 7.







Diamonds 100% Potash 66%
Natural Rubber 100% Zinc 62%
Manganese 98% Mercury 62%
Cobalt 97% Gold 60%
Tantalum 95% Germanium 60%
Bauxite 93% Tungsten 50%
Chromium 92% Beryllium 50%
Platinum 91% Zirconium 50%
Titanium 90% Silver 45%
Tin 85% Petroleum 43%
Nickel 85% Barite 40%
Fluorspar 85% Gypsum 34%
Asbestos 84% Iron Ore 28%
With these kinds of import dependencies it is easy to see that




2 . Mineral and Resource Supply Sources and Usage .
To actually see what kind of impact this could have
on the United States, it is helpful to analyze what uses are
made of imported minerals. Rather than randomly picking min-
erals, the 26 critical minerals listed by the Congressional
Research Service, Library of Congress in their report to the
Subcommittee on African Affairs of September, 1980 is used.
a . Chromium
The United States imports 70 percent of its chrom-
ium while also obtaining 20 percent from strategic stockpile
The usages of minerals described herein are drawn from
a compiliation of the following sources:
1. U.S. Congress, Senate. "Imports of Minerals."
2. Lee Calaway and W.C.J. Van Rensburg, "U.S. Strategic Minerals
Policy Options," Resources Policy , June, 1982, pp. 95-108.
3. W.C.J. Van Rensburg, "Global Competition for Strategic Min-
eral Supplies," Resources Policy , March 1981, pp. 4-13.
4. Bohdan Szuprowicz, How To Avoid Strategic Materials Shortages
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sales and 10 percent from secondary recovery techniques. The
main suppliers are South Africa and the Soviet Union. While
being almost totally dependent on imports, there is a high
possibility of reducing much of the demand for chromium in
the short-run by eliminating non-essential uses. Currently
chromium is essential in the production of stainless steel
as an alloying agent to make it especially resistent to cor-
rosion and oxidation. It is also used in nickel-chromium heat-
ing elements, pigments, catalysts, refractories, in the plating
of metals and in leather processing. Of these uses approxi-
mately 20 percent of the chromium used in wrought and cast
steel, tool steel and some other limited applications may be
irreplaceable. There is only limited substitutability avail-
able by employing nickel, steel or titanium, and in some cases
aluminum (in circumstances where chrome alloy stainless steel
is now employed) . The major military uses of chromium are
in ammunition, armor plate, gun barrels, jet engines and stain-
less steel.
b. Cobalt
Domestic mining of cobalt ended in 1971, making
the United States wholly dependent upon imports, mainly from
Zaire and Zambia for ore and Belgium for refined ore. Cobalt
is a vital alloying element in the aerospace and electrical
product industries as it imparts the essential qualities of
heat resistance, high strength, wear resistance, and superior
magnetic properties. Its major uses are in cutting tools,
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jet engine parts, electrical devices, permanent magnets, cata-
lysts, pigments and dryers for paints and allied products.
Nickel may be substituted in jet engines and gas turbines,
but at a loss in effectiveness. In magnets it may be replaced
by platinum, nickel, barium, strontium ferrite or iron may
be used. Tungsten, molybdenum carbide, nickel and cermics
may be used in some machinery, but there are no substitutes
known in some steel and carbide tools. It may also be replaced
by nickel for a catalyst and by copper, chromium and manganese
in paints. It has military application in jet engines and
aircraft.
c. Columbium
The United States imports the bulk of its Columbium.
From 1969-72 62 percent came from Brazil and 16 percent from
Canada. Zaire is now developing as a major supplier of colum-
bium despite the Katanga secession war in the 1960's and the
two Shaba province invasions from Angola. It is principally
used as an alloying element in the manufacture of specialty
steels and superalloys. It also has a potential use in nuclear
and aerospace applications and in superconductors or electri-
city at cryogenic temperatures. There is some substitutability
by tantalum and vanadium as ferrous substitutes. Columbium
is used by the military in aircraft, jet engines, missiles,




While the United States has long been known for
its steel industry and availability of iron ore resources,
iron ore is now being imported to meet domestic demand. Approx-
imately 30 percent of the iron ore used in the United States
is imported with the majority coming from Canada, Venezuela
and Brazil. The uses of iron ore in iron and steel production
involves the following end-user industries: transportation,
construction, machinery, can and containers, oil and gas in-
dustries, appliances, and equipment. Iron and steel products
surround us in a modern society. Aluminum is the only substi-
tute available and cannot be used in many applications. The
military uses of iron and steel are multifaceted and the mili-
tary is heavily dependent on both.
e. Manganese
The United States has no reserves of manganese
ore that have a 35 percent or greater concentration of man-
ganese and must import at least 98 percent of its annual con-
sumption. The major suppliers are Gabon, Brazil, Australia
and South Africa. Manganese is used in the production of steel,
aluminum, cast iron, dry cell batteries and certain chemicals.
High quality steel requires large quantities of manganese,
for which there is no substitute, and any shortage could cause
serious problems for high technology industries that require





The United States is currently the largest pro-
ducer of molybdenum and as such is in a position of assured
supply. It is used in the manufacture of steels, iron cast-
ings and alloys, and as a refractory metal in the nuclear and
space age metals. It is also becoming increasingly important
in the chemical industry. Ferrous substitutes for molybdenum
include chromium, manganese, nickel, silicon, tantalum, tungsten
and vanadium while non-ferrous substitutes include aluminum
and titanium. Perhaps more important, however, would be mater-
ials for which molybdenum can substituted since it is an assured
domestic product. In that respect molybdenum can substitute,
in some instances, for chromium cobalt, nickel, rhenium, tung-
sten, vanadium and zirconium. The military uses for molybdenum
include jet engines*, shipbuilding and submarines.
g. Nickel
The United States imports approximately 75 percent
of its nickel, of which over 80 percent comes from Canada,
the remainder coming from Norway and Australia. This almost
assures a constant supply. Nickel is an important alloy with
strength and corrosion resistance over a wide range of temper-
atures. It is vital to the iron, steel and aerospace indus-
tries. Nickel can be substituted in almost every use by either
chromium, cobalt, manganese, molybdenum or vanadium, depending
on use, but only at increased cost or loss of product perfor-
mance. Again, with nickel being a relatively available material,
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an analysis of what it can substitute for is helpful. In
varying instances, it can be used instead of chromium, cobalt,
molybdenum, aluminum, cadmium, copper, gold, hafnium, lead
mercury, silver and zirconium. Nickel is a very versatile
mineral and has proven beneficial in many areas. Militarily
it is used in aircraft, armor plate, gun barrels, jet engines,
rocket motors, stainless steel, and submarines.
h. Silicon
Silicon is found in one-quarter of the earth's
crust and as such is extremely plentiful. Most industrialized
countries produce for their own requirements. This is fortu-
nate as it has no substitutes. It is used for deoxidizing
and as a strengthening alloy in the production of iron, steel,
and nonferrous metals. Fiber-optics used in communications,
made from glass, are also dependent on silicon: This reduces
the need for copper, but precision manufacturing technology
and various critical mineral impurities may be required for
the development of laser or LED signal emitters, fibers optics,
fiber connectors, splices, and photodiodes required to use
such systems. Silicon is also used in semiconductors. Mili-
tary uses revolve around its strengthening properties in iron,
steel, and nonferrous metals.
i. Tantalum
While the United States has small reserves of tan-
talum, it imports almost 100 percent of domestic requirement
from Thailand, Canada and Australia. Zaire has larger reserves,
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but has yet to become a major exporter to the United States.
Tantulum is a refractory metal with unique electrical chem-
ical and physical properties applicable for end uses in aero-
space, electronic components, transportation, metal-working
machinery, chemical equipment, and nuclear reactor components.
It has some substitutability with aluminum and platinum. The
military uses are in aircraft and satellites,
j . Tungsten
The United States depends on imports for over 60
percent of its tungsten, of which over 60 percent comes from
Canada with the rest from Peru, Bolivia and Thailand. Its
unique, high-temperature properties make it extremely impor-
tant for end uses in carbides, ferro-alloys, and metals. It
is used in aerospace, gyroscopes, nuclear reactors and rockets
Substitutes in some areas are columbium, molybdenum, rhenium,
tantalum, lead, magnesium, titanium, and zirconium. It has
military applications in aircraft, nuclear reactors, rocket
motors, and stainless steel,
k. Vanadium
The United States imports 2 7 percent of its supply
with 87 percent of that coming from South Africa and the rest
from Chile. Vanadium is used as an alloy in steels and non-
ferrous metals and is especially important for jet engines
and airframes. Vanadium substitutes, to a certain degree,
are columbium, manganese, molybdenum, tungsten, aluminum,
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and platinum. Its military uses are in aircraft, helmets,
and nuclear reactors.
1 . Aluminum
The United States is almost wholly dependent on
imports of which the main suppliers are Jamaica, Australia
and Surinam. Aluminum is used in the automotive, marine, rail,
recreational, motor-scooter, and air-cushion vehicle indus-
tries; electrical and communications equipment; containers
and other packaging; appliances; agricultural and other spe-
cial industrial machinery; and in steel and aluminum chemicals.
Various substitutes in different areas include chromium, iron,
manganese, nickel, beryllium, cadmium, copper, lead, magnesium,
tin, titanium, and zinc. Aluminum has military uses in air-
craft, cartridge casings, missiles, and satellites.
m. Copper
The United States is the leading producer of copper,
but still relies on imports for about 20 percent of its supply.
Those imports are provided by Canada, Peru and Chile. Copper
is important for electrical applications in motors, generators,
power distribution systems, industrial controls, communications
equipment, and house wiring. It is also important in the pro-
duction of roofing, plumbing, decorative items, heat exchangers,
shell casings, instruments, household utensils, jewelry, and
coinage. In some areas the use of chromium, iron, nickel,
and aluminum may prove sufficient as substitutes. Copper
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has military application in ammunition, cartridge casings,
and small arms, not to mention the myriad electrical uses to
which it is put.
n. Gold
The United States imports 54 percent of its gold
with the chief suppliers being South Africa, the Soviet Union,
and Canada. While the primary recognized use of gold is for
monetary and jewelry purposes, it has proven to be very useful
in integrated circuits, for reliable connectors in computers,
shielding for spacecraft, dentistry, glass, coinage and in
brazing alloys for bonding turbine blades. There is little
threat of running out of gold for electronics purposes due
to the huge gold reserves held by the United States. In elec-
tronics in recent years, platinum, palladium, silver, and other
metals have been substituted for gold, but at the risk of lower
product performance and reliability. Gold is used by the mili-
tary in satellites and electronics. To reduce waste the mili-




The United States is the second largest producer
of lead, but still imports about 10-15 percent of its supply,
mainly from Canada, Peru and Mexico. It is used as a metal
alloy in storage batteries; in construction material such as
roofing, piping, and caulking; in structures for protection
against X-rays or radiation; in sporting ammunition; in solder;
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in bearings; in gasoline antiknock additives; in the communi-
cation industry in cables and batteries; and in some brasses
and bronzes. It is also used in chemicals, paints, glass,
porcelain enamel, ceramic glazes, oxidizing agents, explosive
detonators, insecticides, and as a stabilizer in plastics.
Nickel-cadmium batteries could substitute for lead, but it
is expensive and the supply of nickel and cadmium could become
less available than lead. The United States now recycles 40
percent of its lead and is estimated to hold 37 percent of
global lead reserves. The military uses of lead are in ammu-
nition and nuclear shielding,
p. Magnesium
While the Soviet Union has the largest supplies
of magnesium, it appears that the United States has sufficient
supplies to handle its demand. While magnesium has many uses,
it is used in very small amounts. Its compounds are used in
basic refractories, cement, rayon, fertilizer, insulation,
metal, rubber, fluxes, uranium processing, paper processing,
medicines, neoprene compounds and other chemicals, pigments
and paints, glass, ink, ceramics, sugar refining, dyes, and
explosives. As a metal it is used in aluminum alloys, mag-
nesium alloys in the production of aircraft and missiles,
machinery, chemical products, tools, and consumer products.
It is also used as a reducing agent for producing titanium,
zirconium, hafnium, uranium, and beryllium. Some substitutes
in various areas are chromium, iron, aluminum, titanium, zinc,
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and zirconium. Its military usage is in explosives, drugs,
aircraft, and missiles.
q. Platinum Group
The platinum group consists of platinum, palladium,
iridium, rhodium, ruthenium, and osmium, all of which exhibit
outstanding anti-corrosive characteristics and are extremely
rare. The United States imports 91 percent of its platinum,
of which 82 percent comes from South Africa. Platinum metals
are among the most strategic because practically all of the
supplies must come from either the Soviet Union or South Africa
The platinum metals are used as catalysts in petroleum cracking
and refining processes, the chemical, and automotive industries
They are also used as a corrosion-resistant material in the
chemical, eletrical, glass, and medical-dental industries.
Platinum metals are used in only small quantities compara-
tively, but where they are critical, there are no practical
substitutes. Military uses include fuels and aircraft.
r. Silver
The United States is a major producer of silver
and there is little concern about disruptions in supply. The
major uses are in photography, electronics, silverware, and
jewelry. Despite this, the United States still imports roughly
50 percent of the silver used from Canada, Mexico, and Peru.
Because of its importance in photography and electronics, it
is considered strategic. For these purposes, there are few




Over 75 percent of United States tin is imported
from Malaysia, Thailand and Bolivia. About 20 percent of the
tin used is reclaimed from scrap. Tin is used in metal con-
tainers, tanks, boxes, closures, kitchen utensils, solder,
engine bearings, as a plating agent to prevent corrosion; as
an alloy of solder, bronze, and brass; in electrical and elec-
tronic machinery and equipment, jewelry, dental amalgams, and
pewter. Tin is also becoming important in chemicals for plat-
ing baths, as a reducing agent, and as a perfume and soap sta-
bilizer, in the production of polyurethane to strengthen glass
bottles; and as a toothpaste additive. As such, tin is con-
sidered essential to an industrial society, and for many of
its applications there are no completely satisfactory substi-
tutes. In the cases where tin can be replaces, chromium, alu-
minum, antimony, bismuth, cadmium, copper, lead, and zinc are
used as substitutes. The most apparent military application
is in electrical and electronic machinery,
t. Titanium
The United States is almost totally dependent on
imports of titanium from Australia, Canada and India. Titan-
ium serves an important function in the aerospace and aircraft
industries, and as a superalloy. Its major use, however, is
in the manufacture of pigments for surface coatings where it
imparts whiteness, opacity, and brightness to paints and pro-
vides a pigment with a refractive index that also makes it
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suitable for varnish and lacquers. In addition, it is used
in making titanium sponge, welding rod coatings, carbide, and
in ceramic and glass formulations. In many instances, titan-
ium has no acceptable alternative, but in some areas it can
be replaced by iron, aluminum, or zinc. Militarily titanium
is very important in aircraft, helmets, and jet engines.
u. Zinc
The highest zinc reserves in the world are in the
United States (27 percent) and Canada (20 percent)
,
yet the
United States imports over 50 percent of its demand for zinc
from Canada, Mexico, and Australia and is only third in zinc
production. Zinc is the third most commonly used nonferrous
metal in the world. It is used as a galvanizing agent in con-
struction materials; in brass fittings, the transportation
industry for galvanized sheet steel, die-cast alloys, and brass.
Zinc oxide is used in chemicals in photocopying paper, and
in the manufacture of rubber, paint, textiles, and lubricants.
There is no adequate substitute in galvanizing steel, but in
some other areas iron, aluminum, cadmium, magnesium, titanium,
or zirconium may be substituted. It is important to the mili-
tary in ammunition, photography, and small arms.
v. Bituminous Coal and Lignite
The United States is the second leading producer
of coal and has massive reserves. It does not appear that
coal could be in extremely short supply in an emergency. It
is indispensable as a fuel for the production of electric power,
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iron, and steel. It is essential for space heating and gener-
al manufacturing used in the production of chemical raw mater-
ials as a byproduct of coal carbonization such as toluene,
benzene, tar derivatives, and fertilizers. While it could
be replaced in some instances by oil or natural gas, it would
not be economically feasible. Militarily it has no direct
use, but it is essential for its place in the steel industry.
w. Natural Gas
The United States is the leading producer of natur-
al gas and can exist without imports. Natural gas is used
primarily as a fuel resource although ethane, propane, and
butane are used for petrochemical feedstocks.
x. Petroleum
Surprisingly, the United States is the third lar-
gest producer of oil, but still imports over 30 percent of
its oil. This oil comes mainly from Nigeria, Saudi Arabia,
and Canada. It is a fuel for households, commercial enter-
prises, electric utilities, and transportation vehicles. Other
end uses include the manufacturing of food products, paper
products, chemicals, and nonmetallic products. It is of essen-
tial military use as a fuel.
y. Thorium
The United States has major reserves of Thorium.
As of now it is consumed as a fuel for nuclear plants and metal-
lic thorium and thorium oxide are used in radiation detectors,
electric discharge tubes, computers, and incandescent gas
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mantles. It may also be used in magnesium-base alloys and
certain high-strength, corrosion-resistant metals. It could
come into importance as a fuel for high-temperature nuclear
reactors, but this is still at prototype level. Militarily
thorium is important in aircraft, missiles, and nuclear reactors
z . Uranium
The United States is relatively self-sufficient
in uranium, importing less than 15 percent from Canada. Its
major use is as a fuel for nuclear power plants, but it is
also used as an alloy in metals for shielding from X-ray and
gamma radiation, as a colorant in glass and ceramics, and in
steel and non-ferrous metallurgy; as a target in x-ray tubes,
in electrodes in ultraviolet light sources, and in resistors
in incandescent lamps. Militarily it is used as an alloy in
equipment such as artillery shells and missiles; in explosives,
nuclear reactors, shipbuilding, and submarines.
B. TRADE ROUTES
From the foregoing analysis it is evident that the United
States is not only heavily dependent on minerals, but on cer-
tain areas of the globe. It is therefore incumbent upon us
to examine where those regions are.
1 . Areas of Import Dependence
There are certain areas on each continental area or
region that are of importance to the United States. In Europe
there is only light dependence for minerals through Norway
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and Belgium, but there is a disturbing dependence on the Soviet
Union. In North America, Canada is a valuable supplier of
minerals and a relatively secure source. In the area of South
America-Central America-Caribbean there are minerals coming
from Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, Surinam, Chile, Venezuela, Mexico
and Jamaica. The Pacific Basin area suppliers are Australia,
India, Thailand and Malaysia. In Africa, or more precisely
High Africa, supplies come from South Africa, Zaire, Zambia,
Gabon and Nigeria. The Middle East supplier is Saudi Arabia.
Of these areas, most have a trade route relation to the Carib-
bean and the United States, but only Africa and South America-
Central America-Caribbean region have another, more subtle,
relationship.
In High Africa, and especially South Africa, United
States dependence on minerals is heavy.
The United States depends on imports for 92 percent of
its chrome, 91 percent of its platinum, 98 percent of its
manganese, 54 percent of its gold, and 27 percent of its
vanadium. The following percentages of these mineral
commodities imported by the U.S. came solely from South
Africa in 1978: chromite, 48 percent; platinum 82 percent
(includes imports from United Kingdom) ; vanadium, 87 per-
cent; antimony trioxide, 50 percent; ferrochrome, 80 per-
cent; and ferromanganese , 4 5 percent. The major alternative
supplier nation of chromium, platinum, vanadium, and gold
is the USSR. 37
38The estimated reserves in High Africa alone are as follows:
37U.S. Congress, House. "Sub-Sahara Africa", p. 15.
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This supply source is currently threatened in two ways.
First, South Africa is the trans-shipment point for most of
High Africa's minerals. The rail system in southern Africa
is interconnected with the rail system of South Africa to lead
39to ports for shipment by sea. These rail lines are in areas
39
"Why Black Africa Can't Break Hidden Trade Ties With




where guerrillas disrupt them on a regular basis, guerrillas
supported by the Soviet Union and Cuba. The presence of 25,000
40Cuban troops in Angola, 750 in the Congo and 750 in Mozambique
pose a potentially serious threat should the insurgents pro-
gress into a general war throughout High Africa. In that event,
the supply of minerals would be cut to the United States. This
would
directly disrupt strategic and non-strategic sectors of
the U.S. economy. This disruption would be so severe in
the case of certain metals that the President of the Uni-
ted States would have almost no other choice but to assume
economic mobilization powers, impose resource-use priori-
ties, and provide for domestic production capacity if pos-
sible. Neither the stockpile nor substitution would com-
pensate even in the near term for the loss of South African
mineral exports to the West. 41
The second threat would be to the disruption of sea
routes in and through the Caribbean. At present, this does
not seem to be likely, but with Soviet basing in Angola and
privileges in Cuba, the potential is there.
The second area of consideration is that of South
America-Central America-Caribbean. Here the Soviets and the
Cubans have been working hard to make military and diplomatic
advances that would be detrimental to the United States. This




Printers Ltd, 1983) p. 109.
41U.S. Congress, House, "Sub-Saharan Africa", p. 20.
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area provides minerals to the United States, but it is also
the strategic backyard and sea route nexus of the United States
2 . Associated Trade Routes
The dependence of the United States on the Caribbean
for its oceanborne trade is surprising. According to the U.S.
Commerce Department
oceangoing vessels entering or clearing U.S. ports
located in the Gulf Coast region transported 397 mil-
lion long tons of U.S. oceanborne foreign trade during
(calendar year) 1979. This accounted for 48 percent
of all U.S. foreign trade moving via oceanborne trade
routes. Imports accounted for 66 percent.
Gramercy, Louisiana was the leading Gulf port and
became the leading U.S. port in terms of total tonnage.
The port of Houston ranked second. New Orleans, the
third leading U.S. Gulf port, ranked fourth among all
U.S. ports. Eighth through thirteenth were Beaumont,
Baton Rouge, Corpus Christi, Tampa, Port Arthur and
Texas City. 42
While this is impressive, equally dramatic is the amount of
tanker service that traveled through the region. During that
same time period
56 percent of all U.S. tanker service tonnage (239
million long tons) was transported through U.S. Gulf
ports. Gramercy led all U.S. ports. Seven other Gulf
ports were ranked in the top ten: Houston (3rd) , Beau-
mont (4th) , Corpus Christi (5th) , Port Arthur (7th)
,
Texas City (8th), Baton Rouge (9th), New Orleans (10th). 43
42U.S. Department of Commerce. Maritime Administration.
United States Oceanborne Foreign Trade Routes
,
(Washington,




Also, while it would not seem as obvious based on the lists
of minerals suppliers, the Caribbean is a major source of
United States markets.
During 1979 the amount of cargo tonnage transported
between the United States and the Caribbean totaled
226 million long tons. This accounted for 28 per-
cent of all U.S. foreign trade tonnage. U.S. imports
from the Caribbean totaled 212 million long tons and
represented 40 percent of all U.S. imports. 44
Further evidence of the importance of this area is that of
the top thirty trading partners of the United States, five
were in the region: Venezuela (5th) , Mexico (8th) , Bahamas
45(17th), Trindad and Tobago (23rd), and Jamaica (25th).
With all of this worldwide trade occurring, it is essen-
tial to establish the importance of the Caribbean in relation
to it. The Commerce Department rated the top ten trade routes
46
of the United States for 1979 as follows:
Rank Route Route Number
1 Gulf /Caribbean and East Coast Mexico 19
2 Atlantic/Caribbean and East Coast Mexico 4
3 South Atlantic and Gulf/Med, Black Sea and Portugal 13
4 Pacific, Hawaii and Alaska/Far East 29
5 Gulf /United Kingdom and Continental Europe 21
6 Atlantic and Gulf /India, Persian Gulf and Red Sea 18
7 North Atlantic/Med, Black Sea and Portugal 10
8 Gulf/Far East 22
9 Gulf/West Africa 42(14-2)
10 North Atlantic/United Kingdom and Continental Europe 5-7-8-9
44
Ibid., p. 19.
45 Ibid., p. 325.
46 Ibid., p. 332.
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Examining these routes shows that 19 (1st), 4 (2nd), 13 (3rd),
21 (5th), 13 (6th), 22 (8th), and 42 (14-1) (9th) all involve
the Caribbean at one point in the journey. There are many
other designated traded routes that pass through or near the
Caribbean and can be affected by events in that region. This
can be seen by examining the maps of the essential trade
routes, as determined by the Department of Commerce Maritime
47Administration. (See Appendix A)
These trade routes are the lifeblood of the United States
and present a tempting target in any attempt to cripple the
United States. They must be protected by all available means
to ensure the continued economic prosperity and strength of
the United States.
Ibid., pp. 32, 36, 40, 48, 52, 60, 64, 68, 72, 76, 80,
84, 88, 92, 96, 100, 104, 108, 112, 116, 120, 124, 128, 132,




The Caribbean has been recognized as being important to
the security of the United States since before Mahan noted
the intersection of trade routes in the area. He pointed out
that:
At the one all the highways of the Mississippi valley,
all the tributaries and subtributaries of the great
river, meet, and thence they part. At the other all
highways between the Atlantic and Pacific focus and
intersect . 48
Professor Westcott observed, from the writing of Mahan, that
Cuba was essential in the area and stated:
Cuba is the key to the Gulf of Mexico, and also con-
trols three entrances to the Caribbean— the Yucatan,
Windward and Mona Passages. 49
In Mahan ' s analysis of the region he pointed out what he per-
ceived as key to the area:
As between the three possible bases for attempted
control of the Caribbean, no doubts can remain that
Cuba is the most powerful, Jamaica next, and the
Antilles least. 50
These observations were not lost on the Soviet Union as is
apparent by their actions in the region.
48Alfred Thayer Mahan, "Strategic Features of The Gulf
of Mexico and The Caribbean", in Mahan on Naval Warfare , ed
Allan Westcott (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1943) p.
100.
49 Ibid., p. 108.
50 Ibid., p. 108.
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Considering the importance of the Caribbean to the United
States, it would be extremely beneficial to the Soviet Union's
51
correlation of forces if they can negate the benefits of
the area. To do this, they can avail themselves of several
methods, overt and covert.
A. OVERT ACTIVITY
1 . Military/Diplomatic
Since the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine on Decem-
52 53ber 2, 1823 and the Roosevelt Corollary in 1904, the Caribbean
The Soviet viewpoint of military comparisons are termed
the correlation of forces and take all of the following into
consideration when determining the balance of power: geography,
history, politics, economic factors, morale factors and tech-
nology. Any change in one area thereby affects that balance.
From a lecture by Professor Jiri Valenta on 23 January, 1983
on Soviet Military Policy presented at Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, California.
52 In his historic address to Congress, President Monroe
made four basic points: (1) No European power would be allowed
to alter the status quo in the Americas. (2) The American
system of republics was utterly distinct from the European
monarchical system. (3) Any European effort to export its
system to the Americas would be viewed as an unfriendly act,
dangerous to peace. (4) The United States recognized exist-
ing colonial relationships and disclaimed any intent to in-
terfere in European domestic affairs. See Family Encyclopedia
of American History
,
(Pleasantville , New York: The Readers
Digest Association, Inc., 1975) pp. 738-739.
53United States hegemony was formalized when President
Roosevelt enunciated this corollary to the Monroe Doctrine,
which stated that henceforth the United States would feel
free to intervene in any Latin American state guilty of
"chronic wrongdoing" or in danger of falling into anarchy.
See Family Encyclopedia of American History , pp. 738-739.
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has been perceived as an American lake. This perception held
until relatively recently, and was more or less observed by
most other powers. The credibility of the United States con-
trolling the Caribbean was shaken with the fall of Batista,
while the rise of Castro probably confirmed suspicions that
the United States did not control the Caribbean. If any fur-
ther proof was needed, it was provided by the abortive Bay
of Pigs fiasco.
The Soviet Union did not fail to notice this chain
of events takina place in the strategic rear of the other super-
power, the United States. After World War II the Soviet Union
was incapable of involvement outside of the sphere of influ-
ence of its armies and was more concerned with surviving than
in exploitation of other areas. As Soviet power grew and ex-
panded, it was still mainly involved only in Asian and African
affairs. The Caribbean and Latin America were seen as being
in the "sphere of influence" of the United States. An opening
was first seen in the area with the fall of Batista and grow-
54ing disillusionment with Fidel Castro's Cuba. Initially
it appears that Castro sought assistance from the Soviet Union
on economic and political terms to ensure Cuba's survival
54 In 1957-59, as the directing organism for anti-colonial-
ist and anti-imperialist movements, including subversion, in-
surrection and guerrilismo, the Organization for Solidarity
with the Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America was set
up. From Alberto Daniel Faleroni, "Soviet Strategy in Latin
America", in The Soviet Union and Latin America , ed. Joseph
Gregory Oswald and Anthony J. Strover, (New York: Praeger
Publishers: 1970) p. 40.
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against growing United States antipathy. The Soviets did not
appear to be overly eager to openly support Castro until the
55
Bay of Pigs fiasco, and then it moved more overtly. The
question may never be answered as to who actually wanted the
missiles in Cuba; Castro for defense through nuclear deterrence,
Krushchev as a means to equalize the strategic balance, or
a combination of both, but the rapid, massive United States
response dampened what may have become Soviet adventurism in
the Caribbean. The Soviets settled down to taming Castro's
urge to spread revolution and instead, hold what they had and
solidify their position while taking advantage of situations
as they presented themselves. Thomas 0. Enders, Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American affairs, Department of
State reflected on the situation in testimony before joint
session of the Subcommittee On International Economic Policy
and Trade and the Subcommittee On Inter-American Affairs of
the Committee of Foreign Affairs.
For its first 10 years in power the new Communist govern-
ment in Havana tried to replicate its revolution elsewhere
in Latin America. Virtually every country was affected.
In Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, Peru and Bolivia, guer-
rilla FOCOS actually flourished briefly. One by one, how-
ever, these Cuban-assisted insurrections were defeated, and
55
In 1966 the Organization of Latin American Solidarity
(OLAS) was set up with its headquarters in Havana. See





following the death of Che Guevara on a Bolivian hill-
side in 1967, Cuba stopped trying— for a while. 56
It was also during this period that the Cold War began to thaw.
With this thaw, better relations were being established by
the Soviet Union in the Caribbean, and Cuban activity could
jeopardize this involvement. The combination of these factors
has led to the increasing Soviet involvement in the Caribbean
to the present. Leon Goure states:
To exploit the growing opportunities it sees in Latin
America, the Soviet Union is conducting a steady cam-
paign to expand its influence directly throughout the
continent. Moscow means to become a factor in Latin
America not only through Cuba, but through the exer-
cise of its own economic, political, cultural, and if
possible, military capabilities. No longer opposed on
the left by Cuban militancy or on the right by the hos-
tility of the Cold War period, the Soviet Union intends
to move in diplomatically, politically and economically
whenever an opening presents itself. 57
This interest in the Caribbean became apparent after
the consolidation of Castro in Soviet eyes. Previously, in-
terest in the Third World had been restricted to Africa and
Asia, but in 1966 Premier Kosygin stated at the 23rd Congress
of the CPSU:
We attach great importance to extending our economic
relations with the independent Asian, African, and LATIN
56 U.S. Congress, House. "Issues in United States-Cuban
Relations", Hearing Before The Subcommittees on International
Economic Policy and Trade and the Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs,
97th Congress, 2nd Session, 14 December 1982, p. 8.
57Leon Goure and Morris Rothenburg, Soviet Penetration
of Latin America
,
(University of Miami: Center for Advanced
International Studies, 1975), p. 12.
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AMERICAN (emphasis added) countries. Those countries,
whose population comprises about half of all mankind,
have now become the arena of violent struggle against
imperialism. 58
This comment, following, Krushchev's statement, prior to the
Bay of Pigs and Cuban Missile Crisis, that the Monroe Doctrine
59
was a thing of the past, combine to show that the Soviets
no longer deemed the Caribbean an American lake and portended
things to come. The unanticipatedly violent reaction of the
United States to the Soviet move to introduce missiles into
Cuba may have taught Moscow that to make inroads into the Carib-
bean they could not use the overt military methods that were
tolerated inside the Soviet sphere of influence, such as were
used in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and East Germany. The Soviets
have since attempted diplomatic and both overt and covert mili-
tary means to change the correlation of forces in the area
to one more favorable to the Soviet Union.
58 Ibid., p. 134.
59On July 13, 1960, Krushchev was quoted in Pravda: "Life
moves forward: it sweeps away everything that does not corre-
spond to the spirit of the times; it asserts the new, the pro-
gressive. We consider that the Monroe Doctrine has outlived
its time, has outlived itself—has died, so to speak, a natural
death. Now the remains of this doctrine should best be buried,
like all dead things, so that it does not poison the air by
its decay. That would be the correct thing to do, and this
is what will happen, apparently." (From Mose L. Harvey, Soviet
Combat Troops in Cuba (University of Miami: Advanced Interna-
tional Studies Institute: 1979), p. 13.
Leonid Brezhnev, at the Twenty-Third CPSU Congress is
quoted as sayina: "A relatively short while ago, the United
States considered Latin America as its reliable backyard.
Today, however, there is not on that continent a single country
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On the diplomatic side, many areas have been exploited
to gain access to the Caribbean and are still currently being
used, such as economic credits, cultural exchanges and propa-
ganda. These are in an effort to gain respectability and to
strengthen ties between the Soviet Union and the Caribbean.
It has been postulated:
The expansion of Soviet and East European cultural
relations with the Latin American countries may result
in a further increase in the number of Latin American
students attending Soviet bloc schools. The growing
Soviet bloc assistance programs also are likely to in-
crease the demand for Latin American technicians trained
in East Europe. 61
The process of involving Caribbean students in Soviet
schools allows them to identify with the Soviet Union while,
imports of East European hardware and machinery, also build
a dependency on the Soviet Union. This dependency reduces
the United States ties, while reinforcing Soviet ties.
The Soviet Union has also been quite adept at exploit-
ing local feelings of nationalism through propaganda and the
support of local movements. One form of this is:
The Soviet Union has been conducting a propaganda cam-
paign against US military bases in the region, charging
that they constitute another form of US domination of
in which a fight against North American imperialism and its
accomplices is not being waged. .. (and) the CPSU considers it
to be its international duty to continue to do everything
necessary to support the peoples 1 fight for final liberation
from colonial and neo-colonial repression. From Faleroni,
"Soviet Stretegy" in The Soviet Union and Latin America , p. 44
Goure , Soviet Penetration of Latin America, p. 165.
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the countries in the area and an infringement of their
sovereignty. 62
While this is obviously aimed at Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba,
it is accepted as Soviet respect for local sovereignty, through-
out the region, despite Soviet efforts to establish a submarine
base at Cienfuegos in Cuba. Further proof of the Soviet inter-
est in changing the correlation of forces in the Caribbean
is reflected in a statement made by Leonid Brezhnev upon his
visit to Cuba in 1974:
The CPSU and the Communist Party of Cuba, the Soviet
Union and the Republic of Cuba are determined, together
with other fraternal countries and parties, to work for
further positive changes in the international situation
and for making them irreversible . 63
All of these pronouncements create considerable good-
will for the Soviet Union at the expense of the United States.
This is easily accomplished since the Soviet Union has no his-
torical involvement in the Caribbean which thereby allows them
to promote the concept of United States imperialism as opposed
to Soviet benign aid. This has been turned into political,
diplomatic and military capital in many instances. Two cases
in point would be, diplomatically, the Nicaraguan abstention
in the United Nations General Assembly's condemnation of the







64 Roslyn Roberts, "Nicaragua: Conditions and US Interests",
The Library of Congress Congressional Research Service Major
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charge by the National Front for the Liberation of Angola
(FNLA) that 500 enlisted Nicaraguans had been sent to Angola
at the request of Cuban President Fidel Castro (though denied
by Nicaragua). In any event, the Soviet Union now has a
flexible proxy arm with which to act in other Third World areas,
while maintaining its claim of nonintervention and noninvolvement
It is with this in mind that a shift to the military
initiatives of the Soviets is now considered. Of necessity,
the Soviet navy has been the most prominent military actor
in the area. Despite the presence of a Soviet combat brigade,
intelligence-gathering posts manned by Soviet soldiers and
technicians, and of Soviet fighter pilots flying sorties in
6 fi
Cuba, the most visible presence in the area has remained
Issues System Archives. Dudley Knox Library, 1980-81 Supple-
ment Reel VII 0756, Monterey, California.
Ibid.
6 6While each of these aspects taken separately is of no
major concern, taken in conglomeration they form a definite
trend,
"...the Soviet Union has attached great strategic impor-
tance to the acquisition of a military foothold in the
Western hemisphere and has energetically seized upon the
opportunity offered it by Cuban developments to make such
an acquisition. It has been resolute, persistent, and
largely uninhibited by U.S. policies in its efforts to
capitalize on the opportunity. It has freely and repeat-
edly resorted to deception and has assumed relatively
high costs and risks to attain its ends. It has relied
heavily and with great success on salami-slicing tactics
in its military penetration in Cuba. And it gives sig-
nificant evidence that it intends now to use the same
tactics to attain important offensive capabilities in
Cuba" (From Mose L. Harvey, Soviet Combat Troops in Cuba.







Soviet naval deployments to the Caribbean began in
mid-1969 when a task force consisting of a missile-armed
cruiser, two missile-armed destroyers, three attack submarines
(one nuclear) and three auxiliary ships operated in the Carib-
bean, making port visits to Cuba. Since that time, the Soviet
navy has continued to send units to the Caribbean. While the
actual time spent in the Caribbean has varied, the actual per-
69
centage of out-of-area operations has stayed basically stable
(with the exception of 1980; possibly as a result of the in-
creased build-up in the Indian Ocean to counter United States
70presence there) as is shown in Table 1.
fi 7
"To the extent that Soviet foreign policy seeks to pro-
mote and support instability along those littorals which pro-
vide the United States with geostrategic advantage, Moscow
has the easier task of naval presence without the additional
burden of denial and compellent operations. Soviet naval forces
can demonstrate interest through presence, serve as a backdrop
for diplomacy, privide a deterrent to denial or compellent
actions by U.S. /allied naval forces, and claim victory if local
political instability undercuts U.S. interests. (William J.
Taylor, Jr. and Alvin J. Cottrell, "Stability, Political Decay
and Navies," Orbis 26 (Fall 82). (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy
Research Institute, 1982), p. 582.
6 8 United States Office of Naval Intelligence, Understanding
Soviet Naval Developments Fourth Edition (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981) p. 19.
69An out-of-area ship day is defined as one in which a
navy ship is deployed beyond the normal and operating and train-
ing areas of home waters.
70Calculated and compiled from data obtained in Understanding
Soviet Naval Developments
,
p. 16 and Donald Daniels and Theodore
A. Neely, Jr., "Their Navy in 1981", U.S. Naval Institute Pro-
ceedings (October, 1982) p. 112.
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While these statistics do not show a massive commit-
ment of forces to the Caribbean, they do indicate a political
commitment to the area. It is, in essence, a statement to
the United States and the world that the Caribbean is no long-
er the exclusive domain of the United States Navy, and as such,
no longer is within the United States sphere of influence.
Thus far, however, the Soviets have mainly only used their
forces to show support for the Cuban regime. They have shown
no overt military presence in other areas, though covert mili-
71
tary assistance, usually channeled through Cuba, has made
itself felt throughout the region. The fleet, though, has
to date only been used in a peaceful role and as a diplomatic
tool.
2 . Military Usage
What are the possible uses of military force? William
J. Taylor, Jr. and Alvin J. Cottrell postulate several.
For the forseeable future, military force will play
the following peacetime roles in foreign policy, be-
sides acting as a symbol of sovereignty, a backdrop
for diplomacy, and a signal of commitment: deterrence
,
to prevent others from initiating an action that
threatens a particular interest; denial , to make an
adversary abandon a course of action already taken;
compellence
, to induce an adversary to initiate a
particular course of action; acquisition , to seize
territory or resources of others for exploitation
or bargaining purposes; intervention , to stabilize
a preferred regime or to overthrow a hostile regime;
counterintervention
,
to prevent successful intervention
The discovery of massive arms caches in Grenada in three
warehouses and in boxes marked food and agricultural supplies,
some from Cuba and some in Russian, is only one such instance.
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by a small (or another) power contrary to important
interests; collective action , for purposes established




An analysis of each of these uses of force in relation
to Soviet/Cuban forces proves interesting.
In the area of deterrence, the Soviets present their
own personnel in Cuba and the occasional presence of Soviet
naval squadrons as a deterrent to direct United States mili-
tary involvement in Cuba. The stationing of the combat bri-
gade, technicians and advisors at SAM sites, garrisons, bases
and intelligence collection facilities virtually assures Soviet
casualties in the event of a military attack on Cuba. In effect,
these personnel are serving a similar function as United States
forces in Europe, that is, a tripwire. As such, an action
against Cuba invites involvement by the Soviet Union. In this
sense, they are a viable deterrent to any military action.
As a force for denial, the Cubans and Soviets do not
have the conventional forces available to force the United
States to abandon an action already taken. They lack the
requisite force conventionally, but not unconventionally.
Through military support for insurgent groups throughout the
region, they hope to be able to force the United States to
abandon areas by guerrilla warfare methods. This proved
72William J. Taylor, Jr. and Alvin J. Cottroll, "Stability,
Political Decay and Navies", Orbis. 26-3 (Fall 1982): 579.
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successful in Nicaragua, and if the United States is forced
by public opinion to desert El Salvador, it will have suc-
ceeded again.
Compellence on the other hand can be far more subtle.
Through the visits of Soviet naval forces to the area, the
United States is compelled to respond. In response to increas-
ing Soviet ship visits, though few in number, the United States
countered by having United States ships make 475 port visits
73
to 27 different Caribbean countries from 1978 to 1980. While
this can prove beneficial to the United States diplomatically
in the short run, in the long run it can cause an increasing-
ly hard pressed U.S. Navy to divert resources to an area away
from the main Soviet threat in Europe.
In the area of acquisition, the Soviets again are ap-
proaching the situation from a different angle. Their military
presence is part of a coordinated military-diplomatic-economic
effort not to acquire the resources of the Caribbean Basin,
but rather to deny those resources to the United States. Leon
Goure points to this strategy of developing anti-US sentiment
in the region.
The focus of Soviet interests and the main thrust of its
purposes and activities with respect to the revolutionary
movement in Latin America at the present stage is not so
much an extension of Soviet control or the attainment of
outright communist regimes, but the buildup of opposition




and hostility toward the United States and toward those
elements in Latin American societies which have ties with
the United States or favor following a traditional demo-
cratic course. 74
This emphasis towards supporting revolutionary movements is
an effort to achieve a military result without committing
Soviet or Cuban forces directly.
The strategy calls for the exploitation of the national-
ism of the people in the Third World. . . thus allowing
Moscow to conduct an offensive by proxy against United
States interests, while keeping the risks to the Soviet
Union within acceptable bounds and maintaining a great
deal of tactical flexibility . 75
This strategy requires actions on the part of the Cubans to
funnel weapons and train personnel, occasionally even providing
7 fi
their own people for certain missions, while maintaining
a pretext of Soviet and Cuban non-involvement.
In the realm of intervention and counterintervention,
the Soviets have dropped none too subtle hints. Rear Admiral
Stalbo has said that "the Soviet Union maintains a policy of
prevention and prohibition of local wars, and of their most
74Goure , Soviet Penetration of Latin America
, p. 5.
75 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
76A Salvadoran spokesman stated "that there is good evidence
that the guerrillas are now benefiting from on-the-scene Cuban
advice as well as their earlier training in Cuba." He suggest-
ed the presence of Cubans since the blowing up of the Oro Bridge
required expertise with explosives not previously exhibited by
querrillas. K. Larry Storrs, "El Salvador: U.S. Interests and
Policy Options", The Library of Congress Congressional Research




this by placing missiles on our borders. Aside from moving
SSB's and SSBN's closer to our shores, the only currently
available positions for them are in Nicaragua and Cuba. This
seems to be a very unlikely proposal. Memories of the United
States response to missiles in Cuba, possible damage to the
Soviet Union's image as peaceful, the inability of the analogy
to United States missiles in Europe to be maintained under
any scrutiny, and potential loss of control of the missiles
themselves combine to make the threat appear to be baseless.
As propaganda, however, the threat serves its purpose as was
shown by the impetus it provided to the nuclear freeze move-
ment in the United States.
While the Soviets have committed only a small amount
of their military force to the Caribbean, they have been able
to reap disproportionately beneficial results. The forces
in place still provides a sobering consideration of military
potentialities in the event of a general war between the United
States/NATO and the Soviet Union/WTO.
In the event of a general war between NATO and WTO
forces, the actual presence of Soviet units in the Caribbean
will be reduced. If, as is the conventional wisdom, the Soviets
maintain most of their general purpose surface and subsurface
units in bastions for the protection of their SSBN force, there
will be few available units for deployment outside these Soviet




rapid cessation should they breakout." While this seems
to indicate a hands-off policy, experience has shown other-
wise. He then went on further, however.
The experience of employment of naval forces in local
wars generally bore a one-sided character. It cannot
be fully extended to fleets in the case where they are
operating against a naval opponent who is the equiva-
lent or superior in forces. '°
This seems to be an intimation that the United States can no
longer be assured of mastery of the seas in the event of an
attempted move into a local war. The threat seems to be that
Soviet forces can now become involved in these activities to
the detriment of the United States.
The threat of collective action, while minimal at pre-
sent, may pose a potential future threat as more and more coun-
tries fall into the Soviet sphere. At such a future point
the Organization of American States could potentially be sub-
verted enough to actually invite the Soviets into an area as
an arbitor. As farfetched as it seems now, if current trends
continue, it could prove to be possible in the future.
The Soviets can make one more use of their military
in the Caribbean: propaganda. In an attempt at forestalling
the positioning of GLCM 1 s and Pershing II missiles in Europe,
the Soviets announced that they would thus be forced to counter
77Rear Admiral K. Stalbo, Soviet Navy, Doctor of Naval
Sciences, "Naval Forces in Local Wars", Morskoy Sbornik, No
9 (1976) p. 23.
78 Ibid., p. 28.
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in the Caribbean, by proxy, perhaps with the assistance of
a handful of Soviet submarines or other forces.
With the United States involvement in a general war
in Europe, most naval and air units will be employed in the
North Atlantic, Pacific and Mediterranean. The coastal defense
of the United States will range from weak to nonexistent, leav-
ing the US open to possible Cuban actions in the Caribbean.
This would be possible due to the paucity of forces in the
area with redeployments to Europe. This leaves the United
States with a choice of retaining forces in the continental
United States to prevent any "backyard" subversion or of leav-
ing the Caribbean relatively defenseless. 'Without U.S. forces,
Cuba and Nicaragua greatly "outgun" any combination of Carib-
bean forces. (See Appendix B) If the former option is chosen,
the United States could either choose to neutralize Cuba and
Nicaragua by military action or the poised threat of action.
In either event, the forces that would be required for this
would be of necessity, considering the size of Nicaragua and
Cuba's defenses, very large. In either event, forces that
are thus engaged are unavailable for the defense of Europe.
This would be of great strategic import to the Soviet Union.
In the event that no forces are devoted to the neutralization
of Cuba and Nicaragua, then they would be available for both
overt and covert operations. Covert operations could include
surreptitious mine-laying in the Florida Straits for SLOC in-
terdiction by merchant, naval surface and subsurface units,
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or actual torpedoing of merchant vessels by submarine; all
the while claiming it to be the action of Soviet units and
maintaining neutrality. The threat of terrorist action would
also prove feasible, many unguarded ports and facilities pre-
senting tempting targets. In the area of overt operations,
possibly delayed so as to lull defenses, there are many tempt-
ing targets, chief among them being the seizure of Guantanamo
Bay Naval Station (justified by claims of territorial soverignty)
Other possibilities to consider would be on shipping by the
Cuban navy, neutralization of SOSUS sites, destruction of oil
rigs in the Gulf of Mexico, overt terrorist raids, raids on
U.S. facilities, attacks of Cape Canaveral to disrupt U.S.
intelligence satellite coverage or other actions. If the arm-
ing and militarization of Nicaragua proceeds along the lines
similar to Cuba, the threat increases.
If it seems feasible to consider such actions, then
consider the reasoning behind a 125,000 man army with 190,000
ready reserves, 350 T-34 tanks, 250 T-54/55 tanks, some 60
T-62 Main Battle Tanks, PT-76 amphibious assualt tanks, a large
styx-missle fleet, a limited amphibious assault capability,
and an air force that includes MIG-2 3 fighters and large num-
79bers of assault-capable transports. Added to this is the
79Data obtained from The International Institute for Stra-
tegic Studies, The Military Balance 1983-1984 . (Cambridge,
England: Heffers Printers Ltd., 1983) pp. 108-109.
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consideration that the United States makes small provision
for coastal/continental defense. There are few Air Force
fighter or bomber bases in the area, and what is located in
the area likely will be stripped for Europe. An added vul-
nerability is that a major resupply of Europe will pass through
80
the Caribbean. The possibility also exists of Soviet Bears
or Backfires making strikes on Cape Canaveral, Bermuda or other
selected strikes and then recovering in Cuba where they pose
a serious threat. They can then either make a return strike
on their return to the Soviet Union or they can remain in Cuba,
where they threaten all of the Gulf Coast and much of the United
States hinterland.
Also, consider the reasons given for the size of the
Cuban military. If it is to defend against their neighbors,
it is overequipped. If it is for a defense against the United
States, while it is substantial, it could never be adequate
against the United States, unless it only has to face a United
States stripped to fight in Europe. Even a glance at Charts
1 and 2 will readily reveal that Cuba and Nicaragua devote
far more to their military forces than would seem to be necessary
80
In testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Western
Hemisphere Affairs on December 15, 1981, Fred C. Ikle, Under
Secretary for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense stated:
"In wartime, half of NATO's supplies would transit by
sea from Gulf ports through the Florida Straits and
onward to Europe. Much of the petroleum shipments
and important reinforcements destined for U.S. forces
in Europe would be originating from Gulf ports. The
security of our maritime operations in the Caribbean,
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to ensure their own security. The argument that they are
needed as defense against the United States also lacks cre-
dence. This leaves one with the question of intent. What
will they do in the event of World War III?
In any eveny, Soviet gains in Latin America, made at
very little cost to themselves and causing immeasurable con-
fusion and turmoil in the United States, can best be summarized
by a statement made by B.N. Ponomarev, CPSU Central Committee
Secretary:
These changes (in Latin America) are having, and unques-
tionably will continue to have, a strong impact on the
further changes in the correlation of world forces in
favor of the international working class and socialism. 81
B. COVERT ACTIVITY
Throughout Soviet activity in the region there has been a
common thread. The Soviets, through the Cubans, have supported
numerous insurgencies and they have almost inevitable resulted
in gains for the Soviets at small cost.
1. Insurgency and Guerrilla Warfare Theory
With the success of Castro in Cuba, focus was brought
8 2
onto insurgency in the Caribbean. Castro and Che Guevara
began to promote what was to become known as the Cuban Guerrilla
8
1
Goure , Soviet Penetration of Latin America , p. 5.
8 2This section has been drawn heavily from a class on modern
Revolution and Terrorism presented by Dr. R.H.S. Stolfi at
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California during the
time frame 11 July 1983 to 2 7 September, 1983.
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Foco Theory. To most Americans, the use of insurgency and
terror as a means of achieving goals was a new development,
but it has been around for a long time. Terrorism has existed
in all places and in all times. No terrorist movements, how-
ever, exist now or have ever existed in which terror was an
end in and of itself. Terror is a tool to achieve an end,
a technique of revolutionary combat. Guerrilla warfare, with
its attendant terrorism, is a part of a revolutionary war.
There are no guerrilla wars or guerrilla movements, only guer-
rilla warfare in the context of a revolutionary war.
Revolutions themselves appear to have similar backgrounds
which, if observed in a country, can be exploited to produce
a revolution. Most of these conditions can be found in the
developing countries of Latin America.
There is usually the combination of a marked increase
in the population, coupled with a revolution in the technology
available, whether it is native to the country, imported, or
as a result of an influx of immigration. In any event, these
have a tendency to lead to increased commercial and industrial
activity which in turn leads to progressive urbanization of
the country. Attendant with urbanization comes the emergence
of a middle class politically. This middle class usually tends
to promote ideas of liberalism (in the classical sense) , nation-
alism and modern democracy. All of these concepts, while not
revolutionary in and of themselves, can be turned to the benefit
of revolutionary groups. This series of events has come to
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be known as the Latter Day Historical Equation. While this
does not automatically result in a revolution, it can be built
upon by other factors. Chalmers Johnson noticed this in his
Political Scientific Equation. He postulated that multiple
dysfunction in a given polity added to an intransigent elite
can combine, when triggered by some event (an X Factor), to
result in a revolution. In determining what exactly multiple
dysfunction means to a society it is extremely helpful to equate
it to the Latter Day Historical Equation. In this way the
two theories not only compliment each other, but they build
one upon the other. Professor Stolfi, in his studies on revo-
lution and terrorism, has formulated an addendum to Chalmers
Johnson. He has noted two additional aspects of revolution.
The first is that there are not only intransigent elites in
power, but intransigent elites out of power. This conflict
between elites is essential to the creation of the tension
involved prior to the outbreak of revolutionary conflict. If
there is no opposing force there may be oppression by one group,
but it cannot by itself result in a revolution. Secondly,
in all successful revolutions there has usually been some form
of charismatic leadership on the winning side. Without a known
leadership, supported by the masses, there is a tendency to
failure. Crane Brinton has also noticed what he terms Tentative
Uniformities in his study of revolutions: Anatomy of a Revolu-
tion. In this area he has noted six tendencies in successful
revolutions. The first is a desertion of the intellectuals.
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Without the support of the learned segments of society, the •
confidence of the masses in their government is reduced
dramatically.
Second, there is almost always an ineffectual use of
force by the government. This is usually as a result of the
third tendency, that is, the government comes to distrust it-
self and paralyzes itself through indecision. That is also
a contributing factor to the fourth tendency, a breakdown of
the machinery of government. If a government cannot function,
it cannor expect popular support and leaves itself open to
revolution.
A fifth tendency is the development of bitter class
conflict as the classes begin to associate more closely with
the development of a middle class and a working class in so-
ciety. The sixth uniformity that Brinton discovered appeared
to be contrary to a common belief about revolutions. He found
that in most successful revolutions the economy and the society
were both improving and were not failing. While they may have
been having difficulties at the time (possibly even due to
revolutionary activity) , the overall trend was one of improve-
ment. All of the aforementioned characteristics can play on
one another, compounding the difficulties experienced by the
government. Brinton also noticed a pattern that developed
after the revolution. Immediately after a successful revolu-
tion the moderate forces come to power, but it is usually only
temporarily. There then comes a radicalization of the revolution
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resulting in the radicals or extremists coming to power. This
results in a period of excess commonly referred to as the terror
Eventually there will be a break in the terror, or a thermidor,
and the moderates will return to power. James Meisel noticed
still another tendency, however. After a successful left-
oriented revolution there is usually a subversion of that revo-
lution by a right authoritarian figure. A very brief case
study in the area will show these tendencies.
In Cuba, after the Spanish American War, there was
a combination of population growth and an increase in avail-
able technology through United States investment. Out of this
grew a middle class with a political identity and a large work-
ing class. Combining with these "multiple dysfunctions" was
the rise of the intransigent elites; Batista being in power,
while insurgent leaders, most notably Castro, represented the
out of power elites. A charismatic leader presented itself
with Fidel Castro and his insurgent campaign in the Sierra
Maestra Mountains. Crane Brinton's tentative uniformities
were also in evidence. The intellectuals, disillusioned with
Batista's dictatorship and methods, did not support the govern-
ment. The army was used very ineffectually by the government
while allowing insurgent activities to cause breakdowns in
the machinery of government. The actions of the government
came to show that it distrusted itself and was unsure of what
actions to take. The rise of wealthy landowners and industrial-
ists had created conflict with the peasant population that
93

was exploited by the guerrillas. All of this was occurring
in a society that was enjoying relatively good economic and
social progress. The historical X Factor appears to have come
during the Battle of Santa Clara (17-31 December, 1958) with
the armored train incident of 22 December. An armored train
with reinforcements for Santa Clara was attacked and the offi-
cers surrendered their forces to an inferior insurgent group.
With the fall of Santa Clara comes the fall of Batista's govern-
ment. Initially, after the fall of Batista, the guerrillas
followed a moderate line and were actually supported by the
United States populace who disapproved of Batista's methods.
These good feelings were not to last for long as the new govern-
ment made increasingly radical changes, including nationalizing
hotels, cinemas and industry. As new economic policies proved
to be failures, more moderate policies were adopted. In the
midst of this left-oriented revolution, Fidel Castro emerged
as the right-oriented (in style of leadership) , authoritarian
figure. Similar chains of events can been seen in Nicaragua
and other Caribbean countries.
With Castro's success in Cuba came the development
of a theory of waging successful guerrilla war that has come
to be known as the Cuban Guerrilla Foco. Perhaps perceiving
the events in the previous theories, Cuba argues that there
is social justice throughout the world and that if properly
exploited, a successful revolutionary war can be conducted
utilizing the guerrilla foco which will result in a successful
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revolution. The guerrilla foco consists of inserting a guer-
rilla unit into an area conducive to guerrilla operations and
then operating under two premises: partisan warfare and psy-
8 3
chological warfare. Partisan warfare would involve waging
a war against ones enemies while psychological warfare (terror)
is waging war against ones friends. The goal is to provoke
the government into repressive measures that alienate the pop-
ulace while simultaneously instilling fear in the populace
and a sense that the government is ineffectual and cannot pro-
tect anyone. This philosophy was outlined explicitly by Carlos
Marighella in his Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerrilla. He stated
that after identifying with popular causes and initially win-
ning a popular base through revolutionary violence, then:
the qovernment has no alternative except to intensify
repression. The police roundups, house searches, arrests
of innocent people, make life in the city unbearable. The
general sentiment is that the government is unjust, incap-
able of solving problems, and resorts purely and simply to
the physical liquidation of its opponents. The political
situation is transformed into a military situation, in
which the militarists appear more and more responsible for
errors and violence. When pacifiers and right-wing oppor-
tunists see the militarists on the brink of the abyss, they
join hands and beg the hangmen for elections and other tripe
designed to fool the masses.
Rejecting the 'so-called political solution,' the urban
guerrillas must become more aggressive and violent, resorting
8 3This is remarkably similar to the French Theory of Revolu-
tionary Warfare which was developed after extensive experience
in Southeast Asia and Algeria. It postulates that psychologi-
cal warfare combined with partisan warfare results in revolu-
tionary warfare. It may not necessarily result in a revolutionary
war, but it might lead to that.
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without letup to sabotage, terrorism, expropriations,
assaults, kidnappings and executions, heightening the
disastrous situation in which the government must act.^4
While Marighella is situated in the cities and the
Cuban Guerrilla Foco is set in the rural areas, the concept
of operations is very similar. Marighella *s thoughts on
guerrilla/terror operations are not new and can be found in
other places. Lenin, when discussing terror and guerrilla
war, made the following statement.
Armed struggle pursues two different aims, which must
be strictly distinguished: in the first place, this
struggle aims at assasinating individuals, chiefs and
subordinates in the army and police; in the second
place, it aims at the confiscation of monetary funds
both from the government and from private per sons. 8
5
Several years later in Brazil, Carlos Marighella wrote:
The armed struggle of the urban guerrilla points toward
two essential objectives:
(a) the physical liquidation of the chiefs and assistants
'of the armed forces and of the police;
(b) the expropriation of government resources and those
belonging to the big capitalists, latifundists , and
imperialists .86
Just as the concepts of revolutionary war have been
borrowed from the Soviet Union, it now appears that the supplies
necessary to wage that war are being obtained from a similar
source
.
84Claire Sterling, The Terror Network , (Nre York: Berkeley
Publishing Corporation, 1981) pp. 20-21.
g c
V.I. Lenin, "Guerrilla Warfare" in A Historical Anthology :
The Guerrilla Reader , ed. Sam C. Sarkesian (Chicago: Precedent
Publishing, Inc., 1975) p. 510.
g c
Carlos Marighella, "Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla" in
Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare , ed. Sam C. Sarkesian (Chicago:
Precedent Publishing, Inc., 1975) p. 510.
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2 . Insurgency and Guerrilla Activity
After a relatively short period of time Cuba again
became active in the internal affairs of her neighbors. Ex-
ploiting the revolutionary potential of Latin America pointed
out in the Latter Day Historical Equation and by Chalmers
Johnson, the Cubans and Soviets have manipulated events in
the Caribbean to the disadvantage of the United States. This
resurgence of activity was noted by Thomas Enders in testimony
before Congress.
In 1978 Cuba turned once again to Latin America. Central
America, where high economic growth had not been matched
by political change and where repressive narrowly-based
military governments clung to power, seemed ripe for revo-
lution. Cuba's intervention helped tip the scale against
the Somoza government in Nicaragua. El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras and Columbia were targeted as follow-ons. In each
case Cuba attempted to weld together disparate local revo-
lutionary factions into a unity, provided training in Cuba
and supplied—or arranged for the supply of—arms to attack
the existing government . 87
The success of the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua
was highly dependent on arms and aid provided by Cuba and the
Soviet Union. Initially, Nicaragua professed neutrality, but
subsequent actions proved otherwise, despite efforts by the
United States to establish and maintain relations with the
new junta. An example of this charade was a statement by
Nicaragua's Interior Minister Tomas Borge "that his country
would avoid buying arms from Communist nations in order to
87
U.S. Congress. House. "Issues in United States-Cuban
Relations," Hearing Before The Subcommittees on International
Economic Policy and Trade and the Subcommittee on Inter-American
Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 97th Congress, 2nd
Session, 14 December 1982, p. 8.
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avoid the pretext to feelings that we are aligning ourselves
8 8
with them politically." While this sounded good to United
States planners, it was soon to show signs of unreality. By
January, five Soviet trade and planning officials began a 2
week visit in Nicaragua to advise the Nicaraguan junta on the
development of its 1980 economic reactivation plan while also
8 9
arranging for the sale of 500 tons of coffee. It was in
the area of trade and economics that initial contacts appeared,
but they progressed to other areas. By March a delegation
of the Sandinista Liberation Front of Nicaragua arrived in
Moscow for talks with Soviet Communist Party officials (among
90them party leaders Kirilenko and Ponomarev) . This same dele-
gation and officials of the CPSU signed documents on estab-
lishing links between the Sandinista Liberation Front and CPSU.
They also signed agreements on economic and technical cooper-
91
ation between Micaragua and the Soviet Union. In a move
to provide the Sandinistas more power and thereby bring Nicara-
gua closer to the Soviet Union, the Nicaraguan council of state
was changed by increasing Sandinista representation from
8 8Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) , Latin
America Area, 8 August 1979. Microfiche. Dudley Knox Library,
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.
89FBIS, 18 January 1980.
90 FBIS, 17 March 1980.




one-third to a clear majority. So it was that the revolution
eventually became subverted to the Soviet cause. From support
from the Cubans and Soviet Union, the Nicaraguans moved to
support Cuban and Soviet aims through the support of Cuban
and Soviet aid as was charged by the United States who released
a special "white paper" and a volume of documents to prove
that the Soviet Union, Cuba and other Communist nations pro-
vided arms to Salvadoran guerrillas in a "well-coordinated,
9 3
covert effort" to overthrow the Salvadoran government. While
it was in the interest of the Soviets to picture the Salvadoran
Guerrillas as oppressed freedom fighters, some nations ignored
the similar circumstances of Nicaragua and agreed with the
Soviet Union. France and Mexico issued a joint resolution,
distributed to the UN Security Council, recognizing the FMLN-FDR
opposition as a "representative political force" legitimately
94
entitled to negotiate a political solution to the crisis.
While this was seized on by the American press as a reason
for the United States to cease support to El Salvador, the
response of nine Latin American nations only a few days later
was largely ignored. Argentina, Bolivia, Columbia, Chile,
Guatemala, Honduras, The Dominican Republic, Paraguay and
92FBIS, 21 April 1980.
93FBIS, 23 February 1981.
94 FBIS, 28 August 1981.
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Venezuela issued a communique condemning that French-Mexican
resolution and accused them of interfering in the internal
affairs of El Salvador by favoring one of the subversive ex-
95tremes trying to seize power. Obviously, those nations see
the threat. Nicaragua is a sepping-stone to El Salvador and
the other nations are concerned of the outcome.
Ironically, many of the guerrillas that fought to over-
throw the Somoza regime have now resumed the fight against
the Sandinistas. They feel that the revolution has been be-
trayed and that the only option is to resume the fight. In
a complete reversal, the Sandinistas, who came to power through
a Cuban/Soviet-backed guerrilla war, are now decrying United
States backing for many of the same guerrillas that assisted
in the overthrow of Somoza. These guerrillas are fighting
for the same reasons as previously. Now, however, the very
actions that placed the Sandinista's in power are an anathema
to them and they call upon world opinion and cite international
law to end these guerrilla actions. These actions should,
however, paint a truer picture of the situation in Nicaragua.
If one looks at Grenada there is more apparent Cuban-
Soviet chicanery. With what appeared to be an opening of warmer
relations between the Marxist-Socialist government of Prime
Minister Maurice Bishop in a visit to the United States came
a swift response; in a coup led by Finance Minister Bernard
95FBIS, 2 September 1981.
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Coard. When thousands of supporters released Bishop, army-
troops fired on the crowd and led Bishop and several others
away at gunpoint. Later it was announced that Bishop, For-
eign Minister Unison Whiteman, Education Minister Jacqueline
Creft, Housing Minister Norris Bain and two union leaders had
96been executed. The coup had been taken over by a 16-member
ruling "Revolutionary Military Council" led by General Hudson
97Austin.
The threat to U.S. students at St. Georges Medical
School and a request by Antigua, Dominica, St. Lucia, St.
Kitts-Nevis, Montserrat, Jamaica and Barbados to take action
98
resulted in the assault. While expecting some Cuban mili-
tary personnel, the presence of as many as 1,100 Cuban troops
and documents indicating that Castro intended to increase that
by 341 officers and 4,000 soldiers to bring strength on the
99island to around 6,800 (including workers) surprised everyone.
The additional discovery of three warehouses stocked with wea-
pons, far more than would be necessary to equip the entire
Grenadian army and militia, gave the proof that Grenada was
not the simple tourist island it proclaimed itself. The size
of the Grenadian military in relation to its neighbors, those
Kenneth W. Banta, "Spice Island Power Play." Time , October
31, 1983, p. 78.
97 Ibid.
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that even have a military, ought to have aroused some suspicion.
The agreement in May 1980 whereby Grenada granted landing rights
to TU-95 Bear reconnaissance aircraft when the new airfield
was completed also was indicative of how Grenada was leaning.
It should appear obvious that Bishop was not ousted
until he attempted to establish better relations with the United
States and spoke of having elections. This would not have
guaranteed the Cubans and Soviets a strategic position in the
Caribbean and he was therefore ousted, then murdered, despite
the exhibited support for Bishop. Popular desires were not
part of the equation for Cuban and Soviet planners.
Events in Cuba, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Grenada
should be more than enough proof that the Soviets, through
the Cubans, are slowly attempting to make the Caribbean into
an area of unrest. This policy damages United States prestige,
and if successful, can endanger the security and well-being
of the United States.




V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Much of the material presented was toward establishing
that the United States does indeed have an interest in the
Caribbean. With increasing Soviet and Cuban involvement in
the region it is even more important to understand the re-
lationship of the Caribbean to the United States. Consider-
ing the interests involved, and working within the constraints
and considerations presented earlier, it is now necessary to
draw conclusions and the requisite recommendations.
It is simple to see that the Caribbean is of considerable
import to the United States. Not only is much of the United
States' trade in the region, but the essential shipping routes
that feed United States industry also are routed through or
near the region. It is essential to maintain those routes
and relationships.
Not as easily discerned, or rather, more easily ignored
or dismissed, is the relationship of the Soviet Union to the
region. The Soviet Union was quick to see United States weak-
nesses in the area and moved to exploit them. Furthermore,
they can work both directly and indirectly through their proxies
the Cubans. The Cuban economy is almost totally dependent
on subsidies from the Soviet Union. To earn their way the
Cubans undertake various tasks for the Soviets, be they com-
bat troops in Angola or training and supplying insurgents
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throughout the region. The Soviets can then make major gains
at no cost to themselves or their reputation by relying on
a local actor to do their "dirty work". Directly, the Soviets
offer economic aid, training, schooling, and cultural exchange
to the area, all being activities that provide the Soviets
with goodwill and a foothold in the region without evoking
charges of interference or intervention.
The United States, on the other hand, has a history of
intervention in the region that can easily be played upon by
nationalists in each country. These nationalist feelings can
then be manipulated to the detriment of the United States.
Also, the proximity of the United States, and its lack of prox-
ies to influence events in the region, has helped to create
the fear of United States involvement in the region. The eco-
nomic and military might of the United States is very intimi-
dating to the Caribbean countries and a trust that would allay
fears of United States might has not been established. To
establish trust and secure the region will require a combina-
tion of diplomatic, economic, and military actions.
A. ECONOMIC/DIPLOMATIC RECOMMENDATIONS
One of the greatest stumbling blocks to United States rela-
tions in the region revolves around what is now called the
New Economic Order (NEO) put forward by the countries of the
Third World. The Third World feels that the developed countries
have taken advantage of the less-developed and developing
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countries. To accept the terms of the NEO outright would be
both foolish and counter-productive to all. Instead, what
is needed is for the United States to work with the Caribbean
nations, preferably through the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
,
to develop plans for the economic development of each country
based on realistic capabilities and objectives. Rather than
giving aid directly to each country and allowing them to spend
it as they will, route that same funding through CARICOM for
distribution. Distribution should be based on feasibility
and long-term effects in each country, with a panel of impar-
tial experts utilized as a deciding body. Each nation would
need some guarantees of aid in order to avoid politics enter-
ing into discussion, but only a guarantee that they could re-
ceive the aid based on the panel's report. To further assist
development, United States influence in the International Mone-
tary Fund and World Bank could be employed to aid worthwhile
plans, based on realizable repayment of all loans. Other assis-
tance could be forthcoming through United Nations organizations
that the- United States plays a major contributing part in.
With the United States only assisting through other agencies,
the fear of direct involvement or dictation of plans is avoided
while amassing substantial goodwill.
Furthermore, a rapproachment between multinational corpor-
ations and the Caribbean countries should be realized. Rather
than arguing over equitable economic rents or taxing profits,
it would be more rational to establish a profit-sharing and/or
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some form of partial ownership system between each country
and the multinational corporation. This gives the multina-
tional the assurance and the incentive to establish industry
or remain in a country while the country then has an incentive
to work with the multinational to maximize profits and, there-
by, its own revenues. The incentive for the multinational
to attempt this may be induced by changes in the tax laws to
allow the corporation to write off the share of profits paid
to the country as a business expense and any partnership deals
as a deduction. Encouragement should also be given to placing
nationals on executive boards and in positions of leadership,
along with running training programs to train nationals in
all aspects of plant operation. These compromises give all
concerned an interest in the preservation and efficient oper-
ation of the facility. This interest could alleviate bad feel-
ings toward multinationals and the United States while also
producing economically sound bases with which foreign countries
may realize profits for use in their own countries.
On a more grandiose scale, the United States, jointly with
the Organization of American States, should initiate action
to lift the embargo from Cuba. Many countries are currently
ignoring it anyway, and it mainly serves to provoke resent-
ment among the people the United States should be working with.
It is currently excellent propaganda in the hands of the Cubans
who point to it as United States aggression and use it to mobil-
ize support for the Castro government. To date it has mostly
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been a counterproductive policy and should be curtailed. Max-
imum advantage should be made of Cuba's extended position as
a Soviet satellite and its poor economic performance. Trade
and exposure with the OAS , United States and Western powers
may make gradual inroads into the Cuban economy, reducing their
will to continue living under wartime conditions fearing immi-
nent invasion. It is a policy that should be undertaken now,
while Fidel Castro is still alive and ruling the island. Cur-
rently, Fidel Castro is enjoying the benefits of a "cult of
personality" type of leadership. When he either dies or relin-
quishes control, it would be beneficial to have some other
group than the fidelistas or raullistas, who are hard-core
anti-United States, assume the reins of power. A softening
of the United States position on the embargo would encourage
and support more moderate factions in Cuba. If Castro claims
responsibility for a United States backdown, it doesn't matter
as lonq as the United States be the one to initiate the pro-
ceedings for renouncing the embargo. This should make it
apparent that the United States has developed a new policy
for the Caribbean; one of cooperation rather than coercion.
The fear of the giant to the north must be reduced. The best
way to accomplish this is not through obvious threats, but
through cooperation. Americans know that it is highly unlike-
ly that the United States would invade Cuba without very ser-
ious provocation, as does the Cuban leadership, so bluster
does no more than to promote Cuban nationalism. This does
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not mean that the United States force levels should be reduced
in the region, rather their presence should be quietly increased,
The old slogan of "speak softly, but carry a big stick" still
applies. The rapid and effective use of force in Grenada
yielded numerous beneficial results in other areas:
Nicuragua: 1000 Cuban advisors have left and offer to send
remainder home if United States advisors leave
also,
-hinted that elections will be held in 1985,
-made overtures to Catholic Church and business
community,
-eased censorship slightly,
-agreed to regional peace talks,
-announced that Salvadoran rebels are no longer
welcome on Nicaraguan soil,
Suriname: ordered the Cuban ambassador home,
Cuba: a setback to revolutionary activity in Caribbean,
Grenada: strong pro-United States feelings created.
Diplomatically, consideration should be given to recognizing
Cuba and normalizing relations. As has been frequently noted,
recognition does not imply approval. Normalization would assist
United States efforts in dealing with Cuba by not dealing with
them as a non-state. It will also serve to eliminate another
Cuban propaganda device and to further show a change of atti-
tude in the Caribbean. If properly handled, it need not be
seen as weakness, instead, it needs to be presented as dealing
with Cuba from a position of strength.
Another aspect that requires consideration is the state
of affairs in agriculture in most of these countries. To begin
with, some form of land reform is necessary to erase the dis-
content of the latifundist past. For this to be successful
requires a gradual distribution of land based on ability to
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work it. In conjunction with this would be an agricultural
training program to acquaint the farmers with the best suited
procedures and crops for the area. The United States should
promote such programs as Vista and the Peace Corps and assist
in providing seed to the area. This could prove to be benefi-
cial to the individuals and countries involved in the program
as it provides the small farmers with a stake in the future.
There is another aspect to consider, however, that of mili-
tary relationships. Due to the poor economic conditions in
the area, insurgencies have an excellent breeding ground.
While the previous economic and diplomatic proposals could
improve the situation, it is not to the advantage of the in-
surgents to have any beneficial changes take place. It is
correct to assume that they will do all that they can to pre-
vent or counter change that may prove detrimental to their
cause. Therefore, it is necessary to include the military
in any program for the region.
B. MILITARY/COUNTER-INSURGENT RECOMMENDATIONS
The United States has vital economic and military inter-
ests in the Caribbean, and accordingly, must take action to
ensure their safety and security.
No longer can the United States consider the Caribbean
a secure area which requires minimal expenditure of military
force as a presence. An increased operating tempo for all
forces is necessary, including joint activities with nations
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of the region. The current Big Pine II exercises in the
Caribbean are an excellent case in point. Not only is the
United States showing a commitment to the region and receiving
excellent training opportunities, but other nations are bene-
fitting through cooperation with those forces. On a lesser
scale there are many activities that can be jointly conducted.
In the area of drug interdiction, the United States Air Force
and Navy could fly joint surveillance flights, perhaps with
some crew members or visitors from involved countries. The
Navy could also work with local navies and coastal forces in
the same area. Fisheries patrol is another area of possible
cooperation. All efforts should be made to meaningfully employ
joint forces in the region.
Also called for is a strengthening of United States air
and coastal defenses. The United States must not appear vul-
nerable in this area. Basing and activity of air and naval
forces should be such as to secure free and open sea lines
of communication (SLOC) under any contingency. Negotiating
from weakness is always a bad policy when it can be foreseen
and avoided.
In the area of insurgency the United States must continue
its policy of non-involvement of combat troops. The United
States public suffers from an acute case of "Vietnam Syndrome"
and any involvement of United States combat troops in local
insurgencies would immediately be labeled "another Vietnam",
irregardless of the situation. The United States public also
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has little patience. The mission in Grenada was approved by
the populace because it was quick and successful. If the
troops had become bogged down in a guerrilla war, the public
reaction would have been far different. The policy of train-
ing and supporting local forces to handle insurgencies is the
correct path. Emphasis needs to be placed on training the
officer corps of each country also. In the Caribbean, most
of the militaries have an entrenched upper command, but the
lower ranking officers are more amenable to counter-insurgent
training. They must also be impressed with the idea that there
are limits to the use of force. Local populaces are not won
over by brute force. They may comply with the demands, but
the battle for the "hearts and minds" of the civilian populace
will be lost. Public works by the military will make a lasting
impression. Bringing in doctors and nurses, repairing build-
ings, and non-interference with public life, as far as possible,
will produce positive results. Right-wing death squads are
as much the enemy as the insurgents, possibly more so, since
they undermine support for the government. As such, they must
be eliminated.
To defeat the insurgent does not only mean the defeat of
his military force and political structure in an area, since
they can be rebuilt, it requires attainment of the support
of the populace. If the populace does not support the insur-
gent, or is at least apathetic, the insurgent cannot function.
To attain support from the populace, the government must adopt
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the cause of the insurgents and make it their own. Propaganda,
however, is not enough to do this. It requires concrete, long-
term action on the part of the government to achieve. If the
problem, or cause, is being solved, the insurgency loses its
momentum. Even if another cause is then espoused, the goodwill
toward the government has increased and made the insurgents
task more difficult.
The problem with this type of counter-insurgency is that
it is long and costly. The governments will need the support
of the United States to affect it. The costs to the United
States may seem heavy, but the cost if it is not borne may




First, improve diplomatic relations with Cuba. Any lessen-
ing of hostility from that quarter can only benefit United
States interests in the region and should improve the image
of the United States throughout the region.
Secondly, work with the countries of the region to help
solve their economic problems. Improvements in their indus-
trial and agricultural areas should also spillover into the
middle-class realm also. As these countries improve and sta-
bilize, the region becomes of less strategic concern to the
United States since its interests will be viewed as secure.
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Third, the United States must establish a credible mili-
tary force in the region. The appearance of weakness invites
exploitation. There is no need to threaten; a quiet estab-
lishment of presence is more than sufficient.
Fourth, the United States should work with governments
in the region in support of counter-insurgency operations.
This should be done in conjunction with their being aided
economically so as to benefit the local populaces. The United
States need not tolerate despotic acts by local rulers and
it should be made obvious that the interest of the United
States is in the country and not a particular ruling elite.
Fifth and lastly, the United States populace needs to be
informed as to what the United States is doing in the region
in straightforward, non-ideological terms. Any policy worked
out for the region can only be successful in the long-run if
the American people understand and support it. Without that




APPENDIX A: ESSENTIAL TRADE ROUTES
Trade Route
Atlantic/East Coast South America 1
Atlantic/West Coast South America 2
Atlantic/Caribbean and East Coast Mexico 4
North Atlantic/United Kingdom and Continental Europe 5-7-8-9
North Atlantic/Scandinavia and Baltic 6
North Atlantic/Med. Black Sea and Portugal 10
South Atlantic/United Kingdom and Continental Europe 11
Atlantic/Far East 12
South Atlantic and Gulf/Med, Black Sea and Portugal 13
Atlantic/West Africa 14-1 (41)
Gulf/West Africa 14-2 (42)
Atlantic/South and East Africa 15-A (51)
Gulf/South and East Africa 15-B (52)
Atlantic and Gulf/Australasia 16
Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific/Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore 17
Atlantic and Gulf/India, Persian Gulf and Red Sea 18
Gulf/Caribbean and East Coast Mexico 19
Gulf/East Coast South America 20
Gulf/United Kingdom and Continental Europe 21
Gulf/Far East 22
Pacific/Caribbean and East Coast Mexico 23
Pacific/East Coast South America 24
Pacific/West Coast South America 25
Pacific, Hawaii and Alaska/UK and Continental Europe 26
Pacific and Hawaii/Australasia 27
Pacific/India, Persian Gulf and Red Sea 28
Pacific, Hawaii and Alaska/Far East 29
Gulf/West Coast South America 31
Great Lakes/United Kingdom and Continental Europe TA I
Great Lakes/West, East and South Africa TA II
Great Lakes/Caribbean and South America TA III
Great Lakes/Med, India, Persian Gulf and Red Sea TA IV
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APPENDIX B : CARIBBEAN MILITARY FORCES
COLOMBIA:
Army: 57,000 (28,500 Conscripts)
10 Infantry Brigades
1 Training Brigade, including Presidential Guard




12 M-3A1 It tks; 41 M-8, 200 EE-9 Cascavel armd cars,
15 EE-11 Urutu, 45 M-3A2 halftrack, M-113A1 APC,
48 M-101 105mm how; 125 81mm, 148 107mm mor; 30
M1A1 4 0mm AA guns
RESERVES: 70,000
NAVY: 9,000 (including 5000 marines)
2 Type 209 subs
2 SX-506 midget subs (in reserve)
3 destroyers: 2 Halland (1 in reserve), 1 US Sumner
1 US Courtney frigate
3 US Cherokee large patrol craft
6 gunboats: 2 Ashville, 3 Arauca, 1 Barronquilla
2 coastal, 8 river patrol craft
2 marine battalions
(On order: 4 FV-1500 corvettes (1 for delivery 1983))
Bases: Cartagena, Buenaventura
Air Force: 4,200; 28 combat aircraft, 10 armed helicopters
Combat Command
1 fighter squadron: 12 Mirage 5 COA, 2 5COR, 2 5COR, 2 5COD
1 COIN squadron with 12 AT-33A (A37-D to replace)
I recce hel sqn: 10 Hughes 500C (OH-64A)
Military Air Transport Command:
Transport Squadron: 1 C-130E, 4 C-54, 20 C-47, 3 HS-748
3 Arara, 2 F-28, 10 DHC-2, 1 Aero
Commander 560A
Helicopter Squadron: 19 UH-1B1H, 13 Bell 205A1, 20
SA-315B Lama
Training and Support Command:
II T-37C, 27 T-41D, 3 RT-33, 12 T-33A, 25 T-34 A/B
,
10 A-37B ac; 8 Bell 47(OH-13) hel,
AAM: R-530
(On order: 12 Kfir C-2 FGA, 12 A-37D COIN, 14 EMB-326
Xavante trg ac; 12 UH-1H hel; AIM/RIM-7F Sparrow AAM,
ASM)
Forces Abroad: Egypt (Sinai MFO) 500.
Para-Military Forces: National Police Force 50,000; 1 HS-748ac,




Army 125,000 (75,000 conscripts)




1 AB assault brigade; Special Force (35,00 men)
Some artillery brigades
AFV: 350 T-34, 250 T-54/55, some 60 T-62 MBT, PT-76
It tks, BRDM-1/2 armd cars; some 100 BMP MICV;
400-40/60/152 APC.
Artillery: 1,200 guns / howitzers including: 76mm, 85 mm,
100 SU-100 SP, 122mm, 130mm, 152mm; BM-21
122mm, BM-14 140mm, BM-24 240mm MRL; 50
FROG-4 SSM; M-43 120mm mortar.
ATK: 57mm guns; 57mm RCL; Sagger, Sapper ATGW
AD: 1,500 AA guns including: ZU-23, 37mm, 57mm, 85mm,
100mm towed, ZSU-23-4 23mm, 30mm M-53 (twin)/
VTR-60P, ZSU-57 57mm SP, SA-7 SAM.
Reserves: 190,000
Navy: 12,000 (8,500 Conscripts)
3 subs: 2 Soviet F-class; 1 W-class (non-operational, trg)
1 Soviet Koni Frigate
11 Soviet large patrol craft: 9 0SA-1, 2 Kronshtadt.
26 Soviet FAC(M) with Styx SSM: 5 Osa-I, 13 OSA-II, 8 Komar
26 Soviet FAC(T): 8 Turya, f P6, 12 P-4
22 Soviet Zhuk FAC (P) ; 12 coastal patrol craft
12 Soviet minesweepers: 2 Sonya, Yevgenya
2 Polnocny LSM, 7 T-4 LCM
Naval Infantry: some 3 50
Bases: Cienfuegos, Cabanas, Mariel, Punta Ballenatos, Banes.
Air Force: 16,000 (11,000 conscripts), 250 combat ac, 38 combat hel
4 FGA squadrons: 1 with 15 Mig-17, 3 with 3 6 Mig-23 BN
Flogger F
16 Interceptor squadrons: 2 with 30 Mig-21F, 3 with 34 21 PFM,
2 with 20 21PFMA, 8 with 100 21 bis,
1 with 15 Mig-23 Flogger E
4 Transport Squadrons: 16 11-14, 35 AN-2, 22 AN-26, 4 Yak-40.
8 Helicopter Squadrons: 60 Mi-4, 40 Mi-8 (perhaps 20 armd),
18 Mi-24 Hind D.
Trainers include: 2 Mig-23U, 10 Mig-21U, some An-2,
30 Zlin 326, some L-39.
AAM: AA-1 Alkali, AA-2 Atoll, AA-8 Aphid
28 SAM bns with 60 SA-2, 140 SA-3; 2 with 12 SA-6
Forces Abroad: Angola 25,000; Congo 750; Ethiopia 11,000;
Mozambique 750; Other Africa 500; S. Yemen
300, Nicaragua 1,000.
Para-Military Forces: Ministry of Interior: State Security
15,000; Frontier Guards 3,500; some 22 craft. Ministry of
Defence: Youth Labor Army 100,000; Civil Defence Force






1 Field Artillery Regiment (2 Battalions)
1 AA Artillery Battalion
1 Mixed Armored Battalion
1 Presidential Guard Battalion
1 Engineer Battalion
20 AML armd cars; 6 V-150 Commando, 20 M3A1 half-track
APC ; 20 M-101 105mm how; 24 120mm mor; 20 4 0mm AA guns.
Navy: 4,500 including naval infantry
1 Canadian River frigate (training)
5 US corvettes: 2 Admirable (ex-minesweepers), 3 Cohoes
5 large patrol craft (3 US Argo, in reserve)
8 coastal patrol craft
1 LSM, 2 LCU
1 naval infantry battalion; 1 commando unit
(on order: 3 PTF-23 patrol boats)
Bases: Santo Domingo, Bani, Haina
Air Force: 4,000; 19 combat aircraft
1 fighter squadron with S F-51D Mustang, 11 T-34B Mentor
1 transport squadron with 5 C-47, 1 DHC-2, 1 Aero Commander
1 helicopter squadron with 2 Bell 205A-1, 2 UH-12E, 6 OH-6A,
3 Alonette II/III, 2 H-19, 2 UK-1
1 Presidential transport flight with 1 SA-365 Dauphin 2
Training: 12 T-6G, 2 AT-11, 2 T-33A, 3 Cessna 170, 4 T-410,
T-34




I Mechanized Cavalry Regiment
1 Artillery Brigade
1 Engineer Battalion
1 Artillery Brigade (2 Battalions)
1 AA Artillery Battalion
1 Parachute Battalion
1 Special Forces Battalion
12 AMX-13 It tks, 18 AML-90 armd cars; 10 M-113 , 20
UR-416 APC; 30 M-101, 6 M-56 105mm, 6 M-114 155mm
how; 81mm, 8 UB-M52 120mm mor; 57mm, M-20 75mm
RCL; LAW RL; 20mm, 6/70 40mm AA guns.
Reserves: 12 infantry regiments
Navy: 3 00
10 patrol boats
Air Force: 2,350 (including AD and security gp) ; 36 combat ac
,
19 combat hel.
2 FGA squadrons: 1 with 4 Ouragan, 6 A- 3
7
I It COIN squadron with 7 Magister, 15 Rallye
1 Recce unit with 4 0-2
1 Transport Squadron with 5 C-47, 2 DC-6B, 5 Aram, 2 C-I23
2 Helicopter Squadrons: 1 COIN with 19 UH-1H; 1 SAR/liason
with 3 Lama, 2 Alouette III, 1 FH-1100
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Training: 3 T-34, 8 T-6, 6 T-41, 9 Cessna (7 180, 1 182, 1 135)
(On order: tpt ac , hel)
Para-iMilitary Forces: National Guard 3,500; National Police
4,000; Treasury Police 2,000; Orden





5 Regional Brigade HQ
1 Presidential Guard Brigade
1 Armored Battalion
17 Infantry Battalions
4 Field Artillery Groups (12 Batteries)
1 AA Artillery Group (2 Batteries)
2 Parachute/Special Forces Battalions
1 Engineer Battalion
4 Recce Squadrons
8 AMX-13, 7 M-3A1 It tks ; 8 M-8 , 10 RBY-1, 6 M3A1,
10 M4A1/3 armd cars; 15 M-113, 7 V-150 Commando APC;
12 M-116 75mm, 36 M-101 105mm how; M-l 81mm, 12
M-30 4.2 in (107mm), 12 EC1A 120mm mor; 12 M/Al
4 0mm AA guns.
Navy: 960 including 650 marines
15 coastal patrol craft
1 LCM; 2 small troop carriers
8 small craft; some armed
12 Zodiac-type assault boats (marines)
Bases: Santo Tomas de Castillas, Sipacate.
Air Force: 600, 16 combat ac , 4 combat hel
1 COIN Squadron: 10 A-37B, 6 PC-7 Turbo-Trainer
1 Transport Squadron: 1 DC-6B, 10 C-47, 11 Arava
1 Comms Squadron with 17 Cessna: 4 170 A/B, 8 172K, 2 180,
2 U-206C, 1 310.
1 Helicopter Squadron with 25 Bell: 9UH-10 (4 armed), 1 Bell 212,
6 412, 5 206B, 4 206L-1.
1 Presidential Flight with 1 Super King Air 2000
Training: 5 PC-7 Turbo Trainer, 5 T-33A, 3 T-37C, 12 T-41
Para-Military Forces: National Police 9,500,; Treasury Police
2,100; Territorial Militia (300,000) forming
HONDURAS
:
Army: 13,500 (10,000 Conscripts)
3 Infantry Brigades
I Armored Car Regiment




16 Scorpion It tks; 12 RBY MK 1 recce veh; M-l 81mm,
M-2 4.2in (107mm), 30 120mm mor; 57mm, 106mm RCL.
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Navy: 500 (50 conscripts)
8 Swiftships patrol craft: 3 105-foot fast, 5 65-foot coastal
Bases: Puerto Cortes, Amapala
Air Force: 1,200 (200 conscripts), 26 combat ac
.
1 PGA Squadron with 12 Super Mystore B2
1 Coin Squadron with 4 F-86E Sabre; 10 A-37B.
1 Transport Squadron with 11 C-47, 2 Arava, 1 Electra,l Westwind
1 Support Squadron with 1 Beech Baron, 4 Cessna (2 180, 2 185),
1 Piper PA-31 Cheyenne ac , 2 S-76 hei
1 Helicopter Squadron with 10 UH-1H (on loan) , 5 UH-1B
Training: 12 T-28A, 7 T-41A
Para-Military Forces: Public Security Forces (FUCEP)
(national police) 4,500
NICARAGUA:
Army: 47,000 (including 25,000 reservists)
7 Military Regions
3 Armored Battalions
10 Infantry Battalions (being reorganized)
1 Field Artillery Group (3 Battalions)
1 Engineer Battalion
1 AA Artillery Group (9 Batteries; with Air Force)
3 M4A3, 45 T- 5 4/5 5 MBT; BRDM-2, 20 Staghound armd
cars; 12 BTR-60 APC; 12 105mm how; 12 D-30, some D-20
152mm gun/how; BM-21 122mm MRL; 24 12 0mm mor;
48 ZIS-2 57mm ATK guns.
Navy: 3 00
4 Dabur, 1 Sewart, 8 other coastal patrol craft, 1 LCM
(On order: 2 French patrol. craft)
Air Force: 1,500 including Air Defence; 10 Combat ac
1 COIN Squadron: 3 T-33A, 3 T-28D, 4 SF-260 Warrior
1 Transport Squadron: 1 C-212A, 1 Arava, 4 C-47
1 Helicopter Squadron: 2 0H-6A, 2 Alouette III, 2 Mi-8 Hip
Air Defense (Army/Air Force): 138 ZPU-4 14.5mm, ZU-23
23mm and 6 M-1939 37mm guns, SA-7 SAM.
(On order: 100 Matra LRF-2 68mm ASM pods)
Reserves: (all services) 50,000, 25,000 on duty in Army
Para-Military Forces: Border Guard, some 4,000 (under Army)
6 Battalions Civilian Militia, perhaps
30,000. Ministry of Interior troops.
VENEZUELA:
Army : 27,500
5 Divisional HQ (regional)
1 Armored Brigade (3 medium, 1 light tank battalions)
1 Ranger Brigade (2 Parachute Battalions)
1 Cavalry Battalion (horsed)
26 Infantry Battalions (2 Mechanized, 11 heavy, 13 light (jungle)
)
4 Artillery Groups, 1 AA Artillery Group
5 Engineer Battalions
75 AMX-30 MBT; 40 AMX-13 It tks; 10 AML-245, 12 M-8,
60 M706E1 armd cars; 25 AMX VCI , 100 V-100 APC;
152

40 75mm, 50 AA-56 I05mm f 35 M-101 105mm towed,
20 MK F3 155mm SP how; 25 160mm SP MRL; 81mm
120mm mor; 3 5 M-18 7 6mm SP ATK guns; 106mm
RCL; SS-11, AS-11 ATGW; 50 40mm AA guns.
Army Aviation
1 Transport Squadron with 1 Islander, 2 Queen Air, 2 King Air
1 Helicopter Squadron with 1 Bell 206B, 7 UH-iD/H
(On order: 2 G-222 transport ac)
Navy: 8,500 including naval air and marines
3 subs: 2 Type 209, 1 US Guppy II
6 Sucre (Lupo) frigates with 8 Gtomat SSM, 1x8 Albatross/
Aspide SAM, 1 hel.
3 Vosper Thornycroft FAC (M) with 2 Otomat SSM
1 1ST, 2 ISM, 12 LCVP (all US)
2 US transports
(On order: 4 LST)
Naval Air Force: 6 combat hel
I ASW Helicopter Squadron (afloat) with 6 MB-212AS
1 3AR Squadron with 3 C-212/200 MR
2 Transport Squadron: 1 DHC-7, 1 HS-748, 1 King Air,
2 Cessna 310/310R, 2 402 ac, 6 Bell
47J hel.
(On order: 2 Cosa C-2I2 Ariocar transports, 6 AB-212 ASW hel)
Marines: 4,500
3 Battalions
LVTP-7 APC, M-42 SP 40mm AA guns
Coastguard:
2 Heavy Cutters (Almirante Clemente frigates)
3 Vosper Thornycroft FAC.(G) '121 ft 1
1 Squadron with 6 S-2E Trackers ac
Bases: Caracas, Puerto Cobello, La Guaira, Puerto de Hierro,
Falcon
Air Force: 4,500; 79 combat ac
2 Light Bomber/Recce Squadrons: 20 Canberra (12 B-8s, 5 B(5)-82,
1 PR-83, 2 T-84)
1 FGA Squadron: 12 Mirages (5 III EV, 5 5V, 2 5DV)
2 Interceptor/FGA Squadrons: 1 with 14 CF-5A, 2 CF-5D; 1 with
10 Mirage IIIEV, 4 5V, 2 5DV
1 COIN Squadron with 15 OV-10E Bronco
1 Presidential (Transport) Squadron with 1 Boeing 737, 1 DC-9,
1 Gulfstream 2, 1 Cessna 500 ac;
2 Bell UH-1H hel
2 Transport Squadrons with 5 C-130H, 5 C-47, 7 C-I23A, 2 G-222
2 Utility/Liason/Recce Squadrons with 3 King Air, 9 Queen Air,
8 Cessna 182N ac; 4 Bell 47G,
13 Alouette III hel
I Helicopter Squadron with 14 Bell (lOUK-iD/H, 2 214ST, 2 412)




(On order: 18 F-16A, 15 CF-5A ftrs , 6 G-222 tpt, 4 CF-5B, 6
F-16 B/D trg ac)
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Para-Military Forces: Fuerza Armadus de Cooperacion: 20,000:
25 UR-416 MICV; 15 Shortland APC ; 120
60mm mor; 3 Arava , 1 Islander, 1 King
Air ac; 3 Agusta 109A, 3 Bell (2 206B,
1 214ST) hel; 40 coastal patrol craft.
HAITI
Army: 6,3 00
Presidential Guard (2 Infantry Battalion, 2 Artillery Battery)
1 Infantry Battalion
Garrison detachments
5 M-5A1 It Iks; 6 V-150 Commando APC; 2 75mm, 4 M-101
105mm how; 81mm mor; M-13 57mm RCL; M-3 3 7mm, M-I
57mm ATK guns
Navy: 300 (Coastguard)
15 coastal patrol craft
Air Force: 200
8 A-37 COIN
4 C-47, 3 DHC-3, 1 Baron, 1 Cessna 310, 1 402 transports
3 Cessna 150, 1 172, 1 Bonanza training ac
6 S-58/CH-34C, 2 Hughes 267C, 2 369C hel
Para-Military Forces: (police) 14,900
PANAMA:
Army : 1500
7 light infantry groups
16 V-150 armd cars


















6 large patrol craft
7 coastal patrol craft
.
Air Force: 50
1 Cessna 402 ac
2 Gazelle hel








10 V-150 Commando APC; 12 81mm mor
Navy: 140
1 large patrol craft
3 coastal patrol craft
Air Force
2 Islander ac
1 King Air ac
1 Cessna 337 ac
1 Centurion II ac








EE-11 Urutu, 4 Short land armd cars; 6 13 0mm guns; 12 81mm,
18 82mm, 20 CH T-53 I20mm mor; SA-7 SAM
Navy : 3 00
1 large patrol craft
7 coastal patrol craft
Air Force: 200
6 BN-2A, 2 DHC-6, 1 Super King Air 200, 1 Cessna U-206F tpt ac
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